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Abstract 
 
 
A License to Kill: 
The Institutional Failure of the Legal System to Hold Police Accountable 
 
Eliana R. Fleischer 
 
 
 
Committee members: Dr. Julian Hayter, Dr. Jessica Flanigan, Professor Mary Kelly Tate 
 
 
In recent years, police shootings of unarmed African American men have become nationally 
visible. With few exceptions, the police officers involved in those shootings have escaped any 
criminal penalties. This paper addresses why so few police officers are convicted after shooting 
unarmed African Americans. Using an interdisciplinary approach, it addresses three aspects of 
the criminal justice system: prosecutorial power, Supreme Court case law, and jury bias. This 
paper argues that the legal system is structured to protect police officers from liability, making it 
unable to deliver justice after on-duty police shootings of unarmed African American men.  
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 4 
Introduction 
“Mere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the 
adversary process.”       
- Thurgood Marshall 
 
The American legal system is supposed to provide justice to all Americans. Due process should 
be afforded to every victim and every alleged offender, and the adversarial system should 
produce just verdicts. But regularly, the legal system fails to provide justice to those who need it 
the most. Racism, sexism, and socio-economic factors permeate the walls of courtrooms and 
prevent justice from ever truly being blind. At every step in the process, from policing to 
adjudication, biases contort the balance of fairness until there is no longer justice. Never is this 
more evident than when police officers stand accused of unnecessarily killing black men in the 
line of duty. The legal system favors police officers and often shields agents of law enforcement 
from punishment. At its worst, the legal system allows bad police officers blanket licenses to kill 
black men.  
 The function of law enforcement officers is to facilitate public safety in the United States. 
Police officers are tasked with protecting people and ensuring the safety of communities. Yet, in 
American cities with sizeable minority populations, police forces often target the very citizens 
they are supposed to protect. Recently, there have been particularly egregious examples of the 
antagonistic relationship between the state and its citizens. Law enforcement in Ferguson, 
Missouri had taken to the practice of excessively fining their citizens in order to raise their 
municipal revenue.1 The police department in Chicago, Illinois lacked the training required to 
 
1 United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, 
(March 4, 2015), 11-12, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
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resolve situations without the use of force.2 The Baltimore, Maryland police department engaged 
in frequent and overly aggressive unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests without sufficient 
oversight.3 While these practices are not unique to these three cities, the cities have been at the 
forefront of America’s debate about the use of police force. In fact, many of these practices are 
common in urban districts all across the country. The modern American consciousness regarding 
police misconduct and violence has been shaped by Los Angeles officers beating Rodney King 
for nearly fifteen minutes in 1992, New York City officers shooting Amadou Diallo forty-one 
times in 1999, and an officer in Ferguson shooting Michael Brown, an unarmed eighteen-year-
old with his hands raised, in 2014.4 In all three cases, the police officers involved were never 
convicted of any criminal charges.  
 Policing black people violently and maliciously has its roots in America’s tortured racial 
history. Southern states created the first law enforcement units to patrol slave communities. 
These slave patrols apprehended and returned runaway slaves, used terrorism to deter slave 
revolts, and sometimes disciplined slaves outside the law.5 Slave patrols cast a long shadow over 
southern policing. After the federal government outlawed slavery, these groups adapted to 
become law enforcement and continued to contain and confine the black labor force. They were 
particularly instrumental in the convict leasing system, which arrested numerous African 
 
2 United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, and United States Attorney's Office, Northern District 
of Illinois, Investigation of the Chicago Police Department, (January 13, 2017), 5, 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download. 
3 United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department, 
(August 10, 2016), 40, https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/883296/download. 
4 Sastry, Anjuli, and Karen Grigsby Bates, “When LA Erupted In Anger: A Look Back At The Rodney King Riots,” 
NPR.org, April 26, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-
rodney-king-riots. 
Nelson, Jill, Police Brutality: An Anthology, W.W. Norton, 2001, 9. 
5 Potter, Gary, “The History of Policing in the United States, Part 1,” Eastern Kentucky University: Police Studies 
Online, June 25, 2013, https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/history-policing-united-states-part-1. 
Dempsey, John, and Linda Forst, An Introduction to Policing, Fifth, Delmar, Cengage Learning, 2009, 10. 
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Americans by manufacturing Jim Crow laws, trumping up charges, and then leasing their labor 
to wealthy white Southerners. The police system in the American North also functioned to 
contain African Americans: the segregation perpetuated during Jim Crow was established and 
enforced first in the North before it was implemented in the South.6 Across the country, when 
race riots broke out, police officers often joined mobs of white people attacking black 
populations.7 Quite a few of these officers, especially in the South, were sympathetic to 
extralegal organizations that terrorized African American communities, like the Ku Klux Klan. 
American law enforcement has always had problems of racism inextricably linked to racial 
diversity.  
  Whether they are aware of the history or not, police officers continue the pattern of over 
policing minority communities using the inherited strategies that were originally created to 
subjugate black people.8 The War on Drugs only multiplied this problem. President Nixon began 
criminalizing drugs on a large scale as a proxy for criminalizing the groups of people who most 
often used those drugs: people against the Vietnam War and African Americans, two groups 
least likely to support him for reelection.9 Under President Reagan, the War on Drugs intensified 
 
6 In the American South, there was a period of time between the end of Reconstruction and the creation of the Jim 
Crow laws that expanded segregation into all aspects of Southern life. Yet during that time, the North already had a 
vast system of laws to keep African Americans as second-class citizens. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, a staunch 
abolitionist who organized and led a black regiment during the Civil War, traveled to the South in 1878 and 
commented on the differences he observed between the treatment of black people in the country’s two regions: “He 
compared the tolerance and acceptance of [African Americans] in the South on trains and street cars, at the polls, in 
the courts and legislatures, in the police force and militia, with attitudes in his native New England and decided that 
the South came off rather better in the comparison.”  
C. Vann Woodward. The Strange Career of Jim Crow. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, 17.  
7 Bryan Stevenson. “A Presumption of Guilt.” In Policing the Black Man: Arrest, Prosecution, and Imprisonment. 
Pantheon Books, 2017, 10-11. 
8 Williams, Hubert, and Murphy, Patrick V, “The Evolving Strategy of Police: A Minority View,” Perspectives on 
Policing, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and 
Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, January 1990, 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/121019.pdf. 
9 Sherman, Erik, “Nixon’s Drug War, An Excuse To Lock Up Blacks And Protesters, Continues,” Forbes, March 23, 
2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2016/03/23/nixons-drug-war-an-excuse-to-lock-up-blacks-and-
protesters-continues/. 
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and the federal government began financially incentivizing police departments to arrest large 
numbers of black drug users through laws that allowed the police to keep seized property and 
profits.10 The new laws and the media campaign that accompanied them cemented the War on 
Drugs in America’s political system, as politicians who do not advocate for “tough on crime” 
policies still have a hard time getting elected or reelected.11 This history is evident in the 
practices of police officers today: Black Americans are overpoliced, and accordingly, account for 
disproportionately high rates of arrests. In fact, African Americans are twice as likely to be 
arrested than their white counterparts.12 These practices result in increased contact and little trust 
between police departments and minority communities. 
 Police forces are one of the few government agents given the liberty to use death to 
enforce the law. This, too, is disproportionately directed at African Americans: it is twenty-one 
times more likely for a young black man to be shot and killed by a police officer than for a young 
white man.13 Police violence has not gotten worse, it is getting filmed. Michael Brown, Samuel 
DuBose, and Tamir Rice were all unarmed when they were shot and killed by police officers. 
The proliferation of smart phones and body cameras placed a national spotlight on bad police-
community relationships. The stories of these men and several others gained publicity and fueled 
what became a national protest against the police brutality of African Americans: The Black 
Lives Matter movement. 
 The injustice does not stop with the police department. These three cases mentioned 
above share another feature: in none of these cases was the offending police officer convicted. 
 
10 Alexander, Michelle, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, New Press, 2012, 50, 
79, 83. 
11 Butler, Paul, Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice, New Press, 2010, 118-119. 
12 Davis, Angela, ed, Policing the Black Man: Arrest, Prosecution, and Imprisonment, Introduction.  
13 Gabrielson, Ryan, Eric Sagara, and Ryann Grochowski Jones, “Deadly Force, in Black and White,” ProPublica, 
October 10, 2014, https://www.propublica.org/article/deadly-force-in-black-and-white. 
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Michael Brown’s killer was not indicted for a crime, Samuel Dubose’s killer had murder charges 
dropped after two trials ended without convictions, Tamir Rice’s killer was never charged. These 
cases are not unique in this respect. Since 2005, fewer than one hundred police officers have 
been arrested for on-duty, fatal shootings, and only three officers have been convicted of 
murder.14 Because of the public spotlight and scrutiny on these three cases there is a larger body 
of evidence publicly available than would be for similar cases, which provides the opportunity to 
study the common factors, but they are not outliers. These three cases are emblematic of a larger 
problem: Why is it that so few police officers are convicted after shooting unarmed African 
Americans?  
The criminal justice system protects police officers after they fatally shoot unarmed 
African Americans. The legal system is set up to favor officers: Prosecutors have unchecked 
power, immense discretion, and are inherently biased due to their relationship with police 
departments; Supreme Court case law sets the burden of proof exceedingly high to convict police 
officers of crimes when using deadly force on the job; and demographically unbalanced juries 
bring implicit biases into the courtroom which psychologically predisposes them to favor the 
police officers. These factors set systemic barriers that make convicting police officers for on-
duty shootings unreasonably difficult.  
  
 
This study builds upon several bodies of scholarship and seeks to contribute to the body of 
literature focused on law enforcement and the use of deadly force. It questions why the legal 
 
14 Ross, Janell, “Police Officers Convicted for Fatal Shootings Are the Exception, Not the Rule,” NBC News, March 
14, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/police-officers-convicted-fatal-shootings-are-exception-not-rule-
n982741. 
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system so frequently fails to hold police officers accountable after shooting unarmed African 
American men. In answering this question, this effort interrogates three distinct aspects of the 
criminal justice system: the role of prosecutors, legal standards created by the Supreme Court, 
and the biases of juries. Scholars have written extensively on these three subjects. 
In recent years, a growing body of literature has emerged on prosecutorial culture.15 
Cases live or die at the hands of prosecutors; it is completely within the discretion of the 
prosecutors’ offices whether a case is pursued or dropped and what punishment is sought for 
alleged crimes.16 Legal scholars agree that no supervisory system holds prosecutors accountable: 
since the creation of the prosecutor position in the 18th century, no system of prosecutorial 
standards has included a measure for accountability.17 Prosecutors have absolute immunity from 
liability, both from public actions in the courtroom and the important non-public decisions that 
determine whether cases continue to trial.18 Even when the decisions to indict alleged offenders 
are placed in the hands of grand juries, prosecutors still wield considerable power. Legal scholars 
contend that grand juries often function as extensions of the prosecutors’ discretion, meaning that 
they rarely make a decision contrary to the prosecutor’s opinion on any case. Moreover, the rules 
of grand jury trials are set up to practically ensure that grand juries decide the way the prosecutor 
believes they should.19 The larger problem is that lawyers often use their positions as prosecutors 
for future careerist ambitions. One scholar found, “…the emergence of the prosecutor’s office as 
 
15 Angela J. Davis. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2009. 
Paul Butler. Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice. The New Press, 2009. 
John F. Pfaff. Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform. Basic Books, 
2017. 
Michelle Alexander. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness.  
16 Angela J. Davis. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor. 
17 Ibid. 
18 John C. Jeffries, Jr. “The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts.” Virginia Law Review 99, no. 2 (April 2013). 
19 Niki Kuckes. “The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence.” American Criminal Law Review 41, 
no. 1 (2004). 
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a stepping stone for higher office was a relatively recent/20th century phenomenon with dramatic 
consequences in American criminal law and mass incarceration.”20 This careerism often 
precludes occupational riskiness or independence: lead prosecutors face more risk in 
transitioning to higher office when having been more lenient towards alleged offenders than 
when having chosen to punish harshly.21 Line prosecutors are beholden to the decisions of their 
bosses, which orients the entire prosecutor’s office towards careerist tendencies.22 Additional 
literature explains that elections, which are the supposed accountability mechanisms for lead 
prosecutors in almost all fifty states, almost always fail to make incumbent prosecutors explain 
their decision-making process or practices. A legal scholar wrote, “Instead of promoting debate 
about priorities and values, the [prosecutorial] campaigns concentrate on more technocratic 
claims about the lawyerly skills of the chief prosecutor or the personal rectitude of the 
candidates. These indicators of competence might tell voters about the ability of a prosecutor to 
choose wisely in a single case. These qualities, however, do not translate into high-quality justice 
for the office as a whole.”23 The historical reality perpetuated by the false-promise of 
competitive elections is only reinforced by the legal system’s refusal to hold prosecutors 
accountable. The power of prosecutors is so far reaching and impenetrable that some scholars 
believe it is the root of the entire mass incarceration problem affecting our country.24  
 This study builds upon the body of work concerning prosecutorial power by 
demonstrating how prosecutors choose to wield significant influence on behalf of police officer 
 
20 Shugerman, Jed. “‘The Rise of the Prosecutor Politicians’: Database of Prosecutorial Experience for Justices, 
Circuit Judges, Governors, AGs, and Senators, 1880-2017.” Shugerblog (blog), July 7, 2017. 
https://shugerblog.com/2017/07/07/the-rise-of-the-prosecutor-politicians-database-of-prosecutorial-experience-for-
justices-circuit-judges-governors-ags-and-senators-1880-2017/. 
21 John F. Pfaff. Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform. 
22 Paul Butler. Let’s Get Free: A Hip-Hop Theory of Justice. 
23 Ronald F. Wright. “How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us.” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 6, no. 2 (2009), 25. 
24 John F. Pfaff. Locked In: The True Causes of Mass Incarceration and How to Achieve Real Reform. 
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defendants. This is in stark contrast to the adversarial way in which prosecutors typically regard 
defendants. The collegial relationship between prosecutors’ offices and police departments and 
the careerist ambitions of prosecutors create a system in which prosecutors have every 
motivation to advocate against punishment for police officers who use deadly force. The lack of 
accountability for prosecutors ensures that they can act on that motivation without threat of 
liability or likelihood of losing reelection. An evaluation of Michael Brown’s case will 
demonstrate that prosecutors advocate for the innocence of police officers, a practice that rarely 
if ever occurs for any other defendant. 
 The Supreme Court has also played a vital role in deciding what happens to law 
enforcement after instances of deadly force. The Supreme Court created legal standards defining 
qualified immunity for public officials, including police officers. The Court’s opinions explain 
that this standard was created to balance two opposing needs: the need for police officers to have 
some protection from liability so they can properly protect the public, and the need for 
accountability when police officers cross the line into violating constitutional rights.25 Some 
legal scholars argue that qualified immunity has no basis in common law and is therefore 
unlawful.26 Others disagree: they contend that qualified immunity is legal because its basis can 
be traced back to early American law and Congress has never indicated it disagrees with how the 
Court has defined or interpreted qualified immunity.27 Scholars intimately familiar with the 
 
25 Pearson v. Callahan, (2009) 555 US 223. 
26 “The [Supreme] Court’s account of common-law qualified immunity has several historical problems. First, there 
was no well-established, good-faith defense in suits about constitutional violations when Section 1983 was enacted, 
nor in Section 1983 suits early after its enactment. Second, to the limited extent a good-faith defense did exist in 
some common-law suits, it was part of the elements of a common-law tort, not a general immunity. Third, qualified 
immunity today is much broader than a good-faith defense.” 
William Baude. “Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?” California Law Review 106, no. 45 (February 18, 2018), 55. 
27 “The [Supreme] Court has concluded that Congress incorporated qualified immunity in Section 1983. And based 
on that conclusion, the Court has done its best to see that Congress’s will is respected.” 
Aaron L. Nielson, and Christopher J. Walker. “A Qualified Defense of Qualified Immunity.” Notre Dame Law 
Review 93, no. 1853 (May 2018), 1862. 
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operations of law enforcement argue that qualified immunity is a necessary protection for police 
officers who must decide to put themselves at risk every day to do their jobs.28 There is even 
recent disagreement within Supreme Court justices, with some upholding qualified immunity and 
others arguing it dangerously gives police officers carte blanche without possibility for 
accountability.29 The doctrine of qualified immunity is informed and strengthened by two core 
Supreme Court cases governing the legal standards regarding police use of excessive force: 
Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989). The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
asserted that police use of force cases must be judged by the standards established in the Fourth 
Amendment only.30 However, some legal scholars argue that the Court’s divergence from using 
the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis to judge police conduct in such cases was the wrong 
decision because it restricted the breadth of arguments that could be made and did not allow for 
expansive remedies to police brutality based on collective treatment of racial groups. Two legal 
scholars stated, “By deracializing police use of force cases, the Court [in Graham] has 
effectively stripped the excessive force inquiry of its racialized component, which is a form of 
institutional colorblindness that ultimately perpetuates structural violence on communities of 
color by failing to acknowledge racially disparate results and the need for race-sensitive 
remedies.”31 Although the legal doctrine concerning police use of deadly force is generally 
considered settled law, there is contention over the merits of the legal standards that dictate how 
police use of violence cases must be adjudicated.  
 
28 Richard G. Schott. “Qualified Immunity - How It Protects Law Enforcement Officers.” FBI: Law Enforcement 
Bulletin, n.d. https://leb.fbi.gov/articles/legal-digest/legal-digest-qualified-immunity-how-it-protects-law-
enforcement-officers. 
29 Kisela v. Hughes, (2018) 584 US __. 
30 Graham v. Connor, (1989) 490 US 386. 
31 Osagie K. Obasogie, and Zachary Newman. “The Futile Fourth Amendment: Understanding Police Excessive 
Force Doctrine through an Empirical Assessment of Graham v. Connor.” Northwestern Law Review 112, no. 6 
(2018), 1496. 
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 This study explains how the Court has shaped the legal doctrine into such a strong and 
binding precedent, detailing the historical evolution of qualified immunity under a Supreme 
Court that has consistently shifted towards conservative majority decisions. The doctrine of 
qualified immunity has expanded from a balanced test to a legal shield which protects police 
officers’ immunity even in the most clearly unnecessary cases of excessive force. Furthermore, 
this study demonstrates that qualified immunity and the reasonable police officer standard 
established in Graham v. Connor created a legal test that often fails to accommodate the 
systemic faults in police use of force against communities of racial minorities. By treating each 
case as an individual incident and necessitating an extremely high standard in order to prove 
unreasonable force, this precedent favors police officers and severely limits the chances for 
police accountability.  
 The American people are active agents in determining police accountability in cases of 
deadly force as members of juries. Although jury trials are one of the more secretive aspects of 
the legal system, considerable scholarship analyzes critical aspects of the jury process, from jury 
selection to what can influence the formation of memory recall during jury deliberation. Juries 
are supposed to be made up of random selections of the least biased individuals that are 
representative of the jurisdictions in which cases are tried, but scholarship shows this is rarely the 
case. One study conducted on federal courts in more than 700 counties found that racial 
minorities are consistently underrepresented in jury pools.32 Experts agree that jury pools are 
formed by methods that are likely to disproportionately exclude people of color.33 During the 
 
32 Mary R. Rose, Raul S. Casarez, and Carmen M. Gutierrez. “Jury Pool Underrepresentation in the Modern Era: 
Evidence from Federal Courts.” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 15, no. 2 (June 2018).  
33 Gau, Jacinta M, “A Jury of Whose Peers? The Impact of Selection Procedures on Racial Composition and the 
Prevalence of Majority-White Juries,” Journal of Crime and Justice 39, no. 1 (August 20, 2015): 75–87, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/0735648X.2015.1087149. 
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period in which attorneys from both sides can choose to exclude specific people from the 
potential jury, studies have shown that the attorneys take race into account to make those 
decisions, even though the Supreme Court has forbidden this practice. One study found, “Both 
anecdote and empirical data converge on the conclusion that, indeed, race frequently influences 
attorneys’ jury selection judgements and tendencies.”34 Scholarship shows that these exclusions 
from juries impact verdicts: studies conclude that more diverse groups of people perform better 
in decision-making tasks.35 When only one juror of color sits on otherwise all-white juries, that 
juror becomes a token, which negates the benefits that could be attained by truly diverse juries.36 
Additionally, scholarship proves that every person on juries brings their own biases to every 
case, including unconscious, implicit biases that are created by societal stereotypes.37 Studies 
have shown that implicit racial biases cause people to categorize information and even create or 
change memories in ways that hurt African American plaintiffs or defendants.38 
This study applies theories concerning jury biases to cases of deadly force by police 
officers against unarmed African American men. The process for choosing jurors is 
systematically oriented to select people less likely to be willing to understand the perspective of 
the victims in these cases. The implicit biases based on stereotypes of African American men 
that impact how memories are formed in combination with the fact that the legal standards with 
which jurors must view the cases are favorable to police officers creates conditions in which 
 
34 Sommers, Samuel R, “Determinants and Consequences of Jury Racial Diversity: Empirical Findings, 
Implications, and Directions for Future Research,” Social Issues and Policy Review 2, no. 1 (2008): 65–102, 73, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-2409.2008.00011.x. 
35 Sommers, Samuel R, “Determinants and Consequences of Jury Racial Diversity: Empirical Findings, 
Implications, and Directions for Future Research.” 
36 Gau, Jacinta M, “A Jury of Whose Peers? The Impact of Selection Procedures on Racial Composition and the 
Prevalence of Majority-White Juries.”  
37 Eberhardt, Jennifer L. Biased: Uncovering the Hidden Prejudice That Shapes What We See, Think, and Do. New 
York: Viking, 2019. 
38 Levinson, Justin D, “Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering,” Duke Law 
Journal 57 (2007), 376-377, https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1336&context=dlj. 
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convictions of police officers are rare. Juries, this study argues, are not well-equipped to decide 
verdicts based on the available evidence in these cases. Analysis of Samuel DuBose’s case will 
demonstrate where juries fail.  
 When taken together, the scholarship surrounding prosecutorial power, legal doctrine, 
and jury bias has significant implications for cases of police shootings of unarmed African 
American men. Unfortunately, much of this scholarship is siloed by subject-area; social scientists 
study prosecutorial power, legal scholars debate qualified immunity, and psychologists analyze 
jury biases. This study synthesizes these three topics in order to holistically study the combined 
effects they have on urban communities of color and the larger socio-political sphere. It 
contributes to the existing literature by examining the criminal justice system via this 
interdisciplinary lens. Ultimately, it underscores how prosecutorial discretion and 
unaccountability, an expanding doctrine of qualified immunity, and biased juries tip the scales 
heavily in favor of police officers within the legal system after instances of police brutality and 
deadly violence. Only by studying these disparate research areas can decisions like the absolute 
absence of consequences for Tamir Rice’s killer be understood. 
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Chapter 1: “Absolute Power and Absolute Immunity:” How Prosecutors’ Interests 
Preclude Police Accountability39 
 
Prosecutors are the most powerful actors in the criminal justice system: they can make cases 
disappear or create cases at their whims. Their decisions are often the difference between 
convictions or vacated charges. The system incentivizes prosecutors to protect police officers in 
cases where police officers stand accused of unnecessarily using deadly force, which is in direct 
contrast to how prosecutors typically treat defendants. There is probably no better example of 
this than Ferguson, Missouri. The case against Darren Wilson, the officer who shot and killed 
Michael Brown in Ferguson in 2014, epitomizes prosecutorial discretion. Robert McCulloch, the 
prosecutor in charge of the case against Officer Wilson, used every opportunity to make a case 
for Wilson by showing that his actions in shooting Brown were justified. Although prosecutors 
typically act to secure as many convictions as quickly as possible, McCulloch legally acted with 
the opposite intentions to ensure Wilson would not be convicted. Marilyn Mosby provides an 
example of an alternative strategy. Mosby, a young, African American women who was elected 
lead prosecutor in Baltimore in 2015, was in charge of the case against the officers who killed 
Freddie Gray (another nationally scrutinized instance of deadly force). Unlike many prosecutors, 
she intended to use her position to advance change in her jurisdiction by granting leniency to 
those accused of nonviolent and drug-related crimes.40 She responded to Freddie Gray’s case by 
swiftly indicting the officers involved in his death. She announced, “I take this oath seriously and 
I want the public to know that my administration is committed to creating a fair and equitable 
justice system for all. No matter what your occupation, your age, your race, your color or your 
creed… To the people of Baltimore and the demonstrators across America: I heard your call for 
 
39 John C. Jeffries, Jr. “The Liability Rule for Constitutional Torts.” 231. 
40 Hylton, Wil S. “Baltimore vs. Marilyn Mosby.” The New York Times, September 28, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-gray-baltimore.html. 
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‘No justice, no peace.’ Your peace is sincerely needed as I work to deliver justice on behalf of 
this young man.”41 Mosby’s intentions as a lead prosecutor of a diverse, urban city stand apart 
from those of most prosecutors. While she made reform a priority, most prosecutors have career 
aspirations and relationships with police departments that lead them to use their discretion more 
similarly to McCulloch’s strategy than Mosby’s. The decisions McCulloch made in presenting 
Brown’s case to the grand jury in Ferguson exemplify the typical prosecutorial reactions to 
police officers’ use of deadly force, which stand in stark comparison to Mosby’s handling of 
Gray’s case and the way prosecutors approach most of their routine cases.  
The powers and discretion that prosecutors have make them the most powerful people in 
the criminal justice system.42 Although police officers make arrests, and therefore are responsible 
for bringing people into the criminal justice system, it is prosecutors who decide whether a case 
even enters a courtroom. When police officers make arrests based on probable cause, they bring 
the cases to prosecutors and make recommendations on charges the accused should face; but this 
is where law enforcement’s power largely ends.43 From that point until the case is dismissed or 
the person is acquitted or convicted, the prosecutor is the most powerful person to determine the 
outcome of that case. A report on prosecutorial misconduct wrote, “The prosecutor is the de 
facto law after an arrest…”44 Prosecutorial power derives from discretionary powers to make the 
following decisions: whom to charge, what to charge, the terms of plea bargains, and whether to 
dismiss charges.   
 
41 “Read the Transcript of Marilyn Mosby’s Statement on Freddie Gray.” Time, May 1, 2015. 
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42 Davis, Angela J. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor. 5.  
43 “Unlocking the Black Box of Prosecution.” Vera Institute of Justice, n.d. https://www.vera.org/unlocking-the-
black-box-of-prosecution/for-community-members. 
44 Steve Weinburg. “Breaking the Rules.” The Center for Public Integrity, May 19, 2014. 
https://publicintegrity.org/politics/state-politics/harmful-error/breaking-the-rules/. 
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The power to charge is in the hands of prosecutors, and prosecutors alone. This decision 
is often based on the amount of evidence there is and can include considerations like the person’s 
past criminal involvement or community reactions, but there are no definite standards with which 
to make the decision of whether to charge someone. The American Bar Association’s Criminal 
Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function state, “The primary duty of the prosecutor is to 
seek justice within the bounds of the law, not merely to convict.”45 However, there is nothing to 
mandate this, so many prosecutors see their primary duty as convicting and incarcerating people, 
irrespective of the circumstances in individual cases.46 The Bar Association details the minimum 
requirements for filing and maintaining charges. It states, “…only if the prosecutor reasonably 
believes that the charges are supported by probable cause, the admissible evidence will be 
sufficient to support conviction beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the decision to charge is in 
the interest of justice.”47 But the standards put forth by the Bar Association are not enforceable, 
and at the early stage in the process, prosecutors do not have to demonstrate that the charge is 
supported by probable cause; as a result, prosecutors can file charges without any supporting 
evidence.  
Prosecutors also choose what charges to bring against the accused. This discretionary 
power is important because of how many laws, both state and federal, one criminal action can 
fall under. Sometimes one action can be charged either as a misdemeanor, which can only be 
punished by fines, or a felony, which is punishable with significant prison time.48 Both federal 
 
45 American Bar Association. “Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function,” 2017. 
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46 Davis, Angela J. “The Power and Discretion of the American Prosecutor.” Droit et Cultures, no. 49 (2005): 55–
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47 American Bar Association. “Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function.”  
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Mass Incarceration.” ACLU, 2019. 
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and state criminal codes have an overwhelming number of different laws that criminalize the 
same conduct. These offenses do not all describe the same action with different levels of 
punishment, but also describe overlapping actions. As one scholar described, “To put this pattern 
in geometric terms, criminal codes consist of a great many more sets of overlapping circles than 
concentric circles. Which is to say that defendants who commit what is, in ordinary terminology, 
a single crime, can be treated as though they committed many different crimes – and that state of 
affairs is not the exception, but the rule.”49 Prosecutors can use these complicated criminal codes 
to choose charges with the recommended punishment that they believe properly fits the crime. 
For example, if someone were to be arrested holding a gun in New York, a prosecutor would 
have the choice of all of the following charges: “criminal possession of weapon in the second 
degree,” which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of three and a half years and a maximum 
of fifteen years in prison, not including parole; “criminal possession of a weapon in the third 
degree,” which carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years and a maximum of seven 
years in prison; or “criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree,” which is a 
misdemeanor instead of a felony and has no associated prison time at all.50 Given mandatory 
minimum sentencing laws, which exist in every state and the federal government, this gives 
prosecutors more power than judges, because if a person is convicted of a crime with an attached 
mandatory minimum sentence, the judge is bound to the sentencing guidelines based on the 
charge chosen by the prosecutor.51  
 
49 Stuntz, William J. “The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law.” Michigan Law Review 100 (2001). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.286392. 17.  
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Random House, 2019. 
51 Davis, Angela J. “The Power and Discretion of the American Prosecutor.” 55–66.  
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 These powers manifest most clearly in the plea-bargaining process, during which the 
prosecutor is the most powerful actor. Plea bargains avoid trials, which are both expensive and 
time consuming.52 About ninety-four percent of felonies cases are resolved via plea deals, which 
means prosecutors determine the punishment for the overwhelming majority of all felony 
cases.53 Because prosecutors can choose what to charge, they often practice overcharging, which 
is charging the defendant with the charge that carries the highest penalty.54 This pressures the 
defendant into accepting the plea deal even if they believe they have a chance to win their case at 
trial, because the consequences for losing at trial are too high. Prosecutors can do this with 
charges they do not believe they can prove if the case goes to trial because there is no standard of 
proof for plea bargains, so prosecutors do not have to show that the charge is justified.55 
Although both sides have to agree to a plea deal, prosecutors have incredible leverage in the 
process.56 The only rule is that prosecutors cannot illegally threaten defendants to accept a plea 
bargain, but this allows for expansive legal threats.57 For example, prosecutors can threaten to 
change the charge to one that carries a life sentence or even the death penalty unless the 
defendant accepts the plea.58 Once the defendant has agreed to a plea deal, the deal briefly goes 
in front of a judge, but judges rarely reject plea deals. In fact, judges are incentivized not to reject 
the deals, because a renegotiation would make the case last longer and risk it going to a jury 
 
52 “Guilty pleas are not simply cheaper than trials; they are enormously cheaper.” 
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trial.59 The results of the plea bargaining process en masse are staggering: one author asserts that 
prosecutors behaving this way is the reason that the United States has a problem of mass 
incarceration.60 African Americans and minorities bear the brunt of this reality. 95 percent of all 
convictions in large urban areas attained through guilty pleas is the typical result of prosecutorial 
power.61 This falls disproportionately on poor, black populations. Young men of color in urban 
areas are disproportionately arrested and disproportionately imprisoned.62 If people accused of 
crimes cannot afford their own council and must have court-appointed representation, as 80 
percent of felony defendants do, they are even more likely to accept an undesirable plea 
bargain.63,64 This includes people who are innocent: the National Registry of Exonerations found 
that 18 percent of exonerations since 1989 were for people who plead guilty.65  
There is an additional aspect required to charging a defendant in the federal system and 
about half the state systems: grand juries. For felony criminal charges in these jurisdictions, the 
prosecutor must convene a grand jury to pass judgement on whether there is probable cause to 
bring the charge against the defendant.66,67 The grand jury practice was originally designed to act 
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as a shield for the individual from the government, by allowing regular citizens a say in the 
process of whether a person should be indicted.68 However, it now largely acts as a “rubber 
stamp” for prosecutors, in that it simply signs off on whatever decision the prosecutor would 
have made independently.69 In fact, there is a saying that a prosecutor could get a jury to ‘indict a 
ham sandwich.’ Grand juries almost always decide in accordance with prosecutors’ 
recommendations because the rules for grand juries favor prosecutors. Grand juries are presented 
with evidence and can hear witness testimony, but unlike a courtroom trial, there is no judge or 
defense counsel. Only the prosecutor is allowed to present the evidence from the case and acts as 
both an advocate for the government’s position and the legal advisor to the citizens serving on 
the grand jury.70 Grand jury proceedings are kept incredibly secretive, often referred to as “black 
boxes,” so it is usually impossible to tell how the prosecutors explained the law to the grand 
jurors.71  
Additionally, Supreme Court precedent has established that there are very few restrictions 
on what the prosecutor chooses to present. Prosecutors can present hearsay to grand juries, 
evidence that would not be admissible in court due to the exclusionary rule—meaning that it was 
obtained illegally—can be presented to grand juries, and prosecutors are under no obligation to 
present exculpatory evidence, which could demonstrate the defendant’s innocence, to the grand 
 
While the probable cause standard ideally insures that there will be no gross errors, it is not nearly as rigorous as the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard, which the trial jury uses. It is the trial jury that is supposed to accept the law as 
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68 Ibid., 209. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 222. 
71 Ibid. 
 23 
jury.72 Essentially, this ensures that prosecutors can present as much or as little evidence as they 
want and explain the relevant law in any manner they choose with no judge or defense attorney 
to contradict their evidence or method. Additionally, there is no double jeopardy for grand juries: 
if a grand jury were to vote that there was not probable cause to indict against the prosecutor’s 
recommendation, the prosecutor could convene another grand jury and try again. This makes 
grand juries’ functionally no more than a ‘rubber stamp’ for the decision of the prosecutor. As a 
statistician wrote, “‘If the prosecutor wants an indictment and doesn’t get one, something has 
gone horribly wrong… It just doesn’t happen.’”73 In the federal system, between October 2009 
and September 2010, prosecutors pursued charges in 193,000 cases and prosecuted 162,350 
cases; only 11 of the more than 3,000 cases that were not prosecuted were due to grand juries not 
indicting the defendant.74 Yet, when the people accused of crimes are police officers, grand 
juries act in the opposite way, almost always refusing to indict police officers. In one county in 
Texas, 288 consecutive grand juries tasked with evaluating police officers all found no probable 
cause to charge any of them.75 
These discrepancies are allowed to persist because prosecutors are largely unaccountable. 
For some prosecutorial powers, there are natural checks in place.76 However, most prosecutorial 
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discretion manifests in decisions that are made outside of the public eye, and therefore are ripe 
for misconduct.77 The most common form of misconduct is failing to disclose exculpatory 
evidence, and it is exacerbated by a culture of misconduct in prosecutors’ offices.78 The right of 
defendants to be presented with exculpatory evidence stems from a Supreme Court decision in 
1963, Brady v. Maryland.79 Yet prosecutors too often withhold this evidence, either purposefully 
or otherwise.80 The Supreme Court has softened the Brady rules which gives prosecutors even 
more latitude: United States v. Hasting (1983) ruled that if prosecutorial misconduct leads only 
to harmless error at trial, the conviction should not be reversed.81 This decision and others 
seemingly contradict the promise of Brady and the accountability standards set forth by the 
American Bar Association. Instead of punishing prosecutors for misconduct, the Court has 
fostered a legal environment in which punishment is rare. One prominent defense attorney, 
Angela Davis, wrote, “The Court’s rulings have sent a very clear message to prosecutors—we 
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will protect your practices from discovery; when they are discovered, we will make it extremely 
difficult for challengers to prevail; and as long as you mount overwhelming evidence against 
defendants, we will not reverse their convictions if you engage in misconduct at trial.”82 
Prosecutors know they are unlikely to face repercussions for misconduct based in their 
discretionary powers, and they use that to their advantage.83  
When prosecutors engage in misconduct to further convictions, not only do they get away 
with it, but they can actually gain career advancements.84 Even in situations where their 
misconduct is caught and reprimanded, it puts no hinderance on their careers. For example, in 
Cook County, Illinois, three prosecutors were harshly criticized in appellate decisions for their 
misconduct in trials, but all three were later promoted and became judges.85 In most cases, 
misconduct is never exposed, because prosecutors have enormous power that plays out behind 
closed doors, and defendants who plead guilty forfeit their right to appeal. When the misconduct 
occurs in private spaces, prosecutors do not have to answer for their actions. This fact alone can 
result in prosecutorial misconduct: “The sense of absolute power engendered by absolute 
immunity is exactly the problem…”86 One measure that attempts to make prosecutors 
accountable is elections. The lead state prosecutor is an elected position in 46 states.87 These lead 
prosecutors, also known as District Attorneys, are in charge of the states’ line prosecutors, and 
can therefore introduce and enforce prosecutorial standards. However, prosecutorial elections fail 
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at properly being accountability structures for prosecutors. 75 percent of District Attorneys seek 
reelection, and when they do, incumbent prosecutors win 95 percent of the time.88 This is largely 
because 85 percent of the times that prosecutors run for reelection, they are unopposed.89 Even if 
elections were more contested and challengers had a better chance to beat incumbent District 
Attorneys, elections would still fail to properly hold chief prosecutors accountable because so 
much of prosecutors’ jobs are not visible to the public. The problem is simple, Davis wrote, “The 
public cannot hold prosecutors accountable for behavior of which they are unaware.”90 This 
allows prosecutors the ability to engage in misconduct and use their discretion in ways that boost 
their conviction rates, which is the most common result of this system.  
However, prosecutorial discretion cuts both ways. Typically, it is used to ensure high 
conviction rates and fill prisons with people of color. But when the accused person is a police 
officer who committed an on-duty police shooting and killed someone, prosecutorial discretion 
works in the opposite way: prosecutors typically do everything in their power to keep the officer 
out of the courtroom and avoid a conviction. This is because prosecutors are incentivized to 
advocate on behalf of police officers, even when they are the accused party. The very nature of 
their job requires a close relationship with police departments. The American Bar Association’s 
aspirational standards for prosecutors includes a section describing the relationship prosecutors 
can build with police officers. The Bar Association says, “The prosecutor should become 
familiar with and respect the experience and specialized expertise of law enforcement 
personnel… Representatives of the prosecutor’s office should meet and confer regularly with law 
enforcement agencies regarding prosecution as well as law enforcement policies.”91 Police 
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officers start cases by bringing evidence to prosecutors, so naturally the prosecutor’s office and 
police department build working relationships. Prosecutors’ close relationships with police 
departments result in protecting police officers by covering up for officers who have broken laws 
to arrest people.92,93 If prosecutors file charges against police officers, they could incur retaliation 
from the police department. One legal scholar writes, “The prosecutor’s job can be made 
extremely onerous if he does not have willing cooperation from the police, both in investigating 
and in presenting evidence in court. As a consequence, the prosecutor sometimes finds himself 
compelled either to present charges against members of the police department for brutality or 
perjury—which impairs cooperation—or to condone or cover up police crime—which is 
unethical.”94 This is exactly what happened to Marilyn Mosby, the Baltimore lead prosecutor 
who charged police officers for Freddie Gray’s death. She requested that the Baltimore police 
execute search warrants to investigate the case—a responsibility only a police officer is allowed 
to do—and the officers refused to carry out the warrants.95 After charging the police officer’s for 
Gray’s death, she found herself at battle against the entire police department, whose help she 
needed to prosecute cases.  
In addition to the institutional repercussions that accompany pursuing charges against 
police officers, prosecutors may face personal backlash for failing to protect police officers from 
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legal consequences. The role of prosecutor functions for many as a stepping-stone for higher 
public office. Studies of state political officials found evidence of so-called “prosecutorial 
politicians” in 38 states.96 For prosecutors with ambitions for higher office, prosecuting a police 
officer would be damaging for their future career aspirations.97 Politicians generally find success 
when they demonstrate that they are tough on crime and politicians who are opposed by police 
unions face an uphill battle for election.98 This provides additional incentives for prosecutors to 
approach cases with accused police officers differently than they do most of their cases. Instead 
of pushing for quick, harsh convictions, prosecutors often protect the officers accused of 
unnecessarily using excessive force, especially when the victims are African American.  
An examination of Michael Brown’s case best demonstrates how the relationship 
between prosecutors and police forces results in a miscarriage of justice. Darren Wilson, a police 
officer in Ferguson, Missouri, shot and killed Michael Brown, an unarmed African American 18-
year old, in August of 2014. Brown and his friend were walking in the middle of the road in 
Ferguson at night after having stolen some cigarillos from a local store. Wilson drove up in his 
police car and told them to move to the sidewalk, and recognized Brown from a description 
circulated regarding the stolen cigarillos. He positioned his car to block the street, and Brown 
approached the car. There was an altercation while Wilson was still in the vehicle, and two shots 
were fired, one of which grazed Brown’s hand. Brown ran away from the car, and Wilson left the 
car and ran after him. Brown turned and moved towards Wilson, and Wilson fired ten shots, at 
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least six of which hit Brown, killing him.99 The St. Louis County Prosecutor’s Office’s decision 
not to charge Wilson with a crime in this case was shockingly predictable.  
The case of Michael Brown epitomizes not merely prosecutorial discretion but how it 
manifests in relation to grand juries. Under Missouri law, the chief prosecutor in Ferguson had a 
choice: he could have filed homicide charges against Wilson, but instead he chose to leave the 
decision to a grand jury.100 He personally believed that no charges should be filed against the 
officer, but instead of declining to pursue the case, he brought it to a grand jury.101 This arguably 
was a decision made to avoid accountability for the grand jury’s decision. A legal scholar states, 
“By allowing the grand jury to deliberate regardless, [the prosecutor] evaded the need to state 
publicly that he personally was deciding not to prosecute Wilson for killing Brown. Instead, he 
argued that he was simply obeying the will of the grand jury.”102 The prosecutors conducted 
Wilson’s grand jury proceedings in contrast to the norm.103 The transcript of the grand jury 
demonstrated that it was closer to how a trial might be conducted than a grand jury 
proceeding.104 In typical grand jury proceedings, only the reporting officer and the victim of the 
crime (if there is one) are called to give testimony, which is usually limited. In this case, about 
sixty witnesses were called to testify.105 Moreover, the prosecutors cross-examined witnesses 
who supported the idea that Wilson should be charged, acting in a capacity that is more similar to 
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defense attorneys than prosecutors. Although this practice is highly unusual for a prosecutor in a 
grand jury setting, the prosecutors asserted that they were trying get to the truth. One of the 
presenting prosecutors explained, “We want you to understand as attorneys it is our job to 
challenge witnesses’ statements and that sometimes, you know, you don’t get to the truth unless 
you challenge a witness statement.”106 The prosecutors also allowed exculpatory evidence to be 
presented, thereby building a case on behalf of Wilson. Grand juries do not allow for defense 
attorneys to be present or argue the opposing side, which usually results in that argument’s 
omission from grand jury proceedings. In this case, the prosecutors called Officer Wilson as a 
witness and allowed him to present evidence on his own behalf. He gave four hours of testimony 
on his version of the events.107 All of this represented highly irregular, but unfortunately 
predictable legal behavior. The Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Williams (1992) that the 
target of grand jury proceedings do not have a Constitutional right to testify to grand juries.108 
Yet the prosecutors in this case allowed Officer Wilson to testify at length to the grand jury. If 
prosecutors were to have acted in this case like they do typically, only witnesses that supported 
charging the defendant would have testified, and certainly Wilson would not have been invited to 
give his version of events. This was clearly a means for the prosecutors to advocate on Wilson’s 
behalf instead of fully prosecuting him.  
The prosecutors also acted contrary to their positions as legal advisors to the jurors. They 
gave “inaccurate and misleading” information to the jurors about the relevant case law regarding 
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whether police officers can shoot fleeing suspects under Missouri law.109 Weeks after the wrong 
information was given to jurors about the relevant law, the prosecutors attempted to correct the 
mistake:  
 
“Previously in the very beginning of this process I printed out a statute for you that was, the statute in 
Missouri for the use of force to affect an arrest. So if you all want to get those out. What we have 
discovered, and we have been going along with this, doing our research, is that the statute in the State of 
Missouri does not comply with the case law… So the statute I gave you, if you want to fold that in half just 
so that you don’t necessarily rely on that because there is a portion of that that doesn’t comply with the 
law… It is not entirely incorrect or inaccurate, but there is something in it that’s not correct, ignore it 
totally.”110  
 
The prosecutors were unclear about the relevant law, first giving jurors a Missouri law that had 
been overturned by the Supreme Court in 1985 and only correcting this weeks later, after Wilson 
had given his testimony.111,112 In this case, the prosecutors also declined to recommend that the 
grand jury should indict the defendant, which contradicts common grand jury proceedings.113 At 
the close of the proceedings, before deliberation, the prosecutors gave a statement that seemed to 
argue against an indictment:  
 
“So in this case because we are talking about probable cause, as we’ve discussed, you must find probable 
cause to believe that he committed the offense that you’re considering and you must find probable cause to 
believe that he did not act in lawful self-defense. Not that he did, but that he did not and that you find 
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probable cause to believe that he did not use lawful force in making the arrest… Probable cause to believe 
that he committed the offense, which means that he met all the elements of that offense… And you must 
find probable cause to believe that Darren Wilson did not act in lawful self-defense and you must find 
probable cause to believe that Darren Wilson did not use lawful force in making an arrest. And only if you 
find those things, which is kind of like finding a negative, you cannot return an indictment on anything or a 
true bill [vote that he should be indicted] unless you find both of those things. Because both are complete 
defenses to any offense and they both have been raised in his, in the evidence.”114  
 
In every way, prosecutors acted contrary to how grand juries typically operate. They gave 
evidence they ordinarily would not have presented, questioned witnesses who supported an 
indictment, and allowed for a lengthy testimony from the defendant himself.115 The prosecutors’ 
conduct in Wilson’s grand jury proceedings demonstrated how differently prosecutors act when 
the defendant is a police officer. A legal scholar wrote, “Unlike other prosecutors who typically 
highlight their best evidence for prosecution, the Ferguson team created an opportunity for jurors 
to doubt probable cause. Through the grand jury screening function, the prosecutors afforded 
Wilson with a degree of due process protection that far exceeded that which is typically granted 
to thousands of defendants who are prosecuted in our criminal justice system every day.”116  
 There are many reasons why the prosecutors could have chosen to treat Wilson with more 
deference than any typical defendant gets. For one, their discretionary powers meant they could. 
Prosecutors have ultimate preference and the tools required to make decisions about the fate of 
those accused of crimes. They can drop all charges, pursue harsh penalties, or negotiate for some 
middle ground with hardly any resistance from inside the system and without threat of 
repercussions for misconduct. Robert McCulloch, the lead prosecutor in Ferguson, had many 
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choices for how to address this case, and he made a conscious and significant choice to present 
the case to the grand jury in the most favorable way to Wilson as possible. Undoubtedly, he 
knew that the worst consequences he could face for this decision would be in the court of public 
opinion, not in any formal legal structure. Perhaps he was motivated by career aspirations and 
calculated that angering the public would be less damaging to any future career prospects than 
angering the police department. Maybe he made the decisions that he did because of the 
relationship that he and his entire office had with the police. The Ferguson Police Department 
was found to be engaging in tactics meant to raise revenue for the city, with little regard for how 
it impacted the safety of the community. This was overwhelmingly targeted at the city’s African 
American population; although only comprising 67 percent of Ferguson’s population, 93 percent 
of the arrested citizens in Ferguson between 2012 and 2014 were African Americans. In 90 
percent of cases in which the police used force, the victims were African Americans.117 
McCulloch had to have been aware and complicit in these practices, given the prosecutors 
office’s involvement with law enforcement. Maybe explicit racism motivated McCulloch to try 
the case in the way that he did because Michael Brown was simply another one of Ferguson’s 
black youth, or maybe McCulloch did not even realize this case fit into the larger narrative of 
police violence against African Americans in Ferguson. There is no way to know what his exact 
motivation was, but the very nature of prosecutorial culture made his decision as predictable as it 
was indisputable. The police officer who killed Michael Brown, like so many other police 
officers who shoot and kill unarmed African American men, walked away without punishment 
because of the way the prosecutors presented the case to a grand jury. Darren Wilson received 
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favorable treatment because of his status as a police officer, thus escaping the treatment that 
usually befalls people who end up in front of a prosecutor accused of a crime.  
 Prosecutors’ main responsibility is to advocate for the punishment of those who allegedly 
committed crimes. They are exceedingly good at this—in fact, they are overly willing to punish 
alleged offenders—with the exception of police officers. The system in place for holding police 
officers accountable is the criminal justice system, in which prosecutors ought to prosecute 
police officers for on-duty crimes just as they would any other alleged offender, yet Darren 
Wilson’s case is an example of their consistent failure to do so. The institutional attributes of 
prosecutors that allow them to systematically imprison large portions of African Americans and 
create mass incarceration also works to inherently protect police officers who use violence 
unnecessarily and illegally. The Ferguson Police Department failed to protect the community on 
an institutional level, practicing criminal behavior as state agents, primarily against the city’s 
African American population.118 The prosecutors’ office is responsible for punishing criminal 
activity, but as it is incentivized to work with and shield the police department from 
investigation, it is incapable of punishing police officers who use unnecessary deadly force 
against the citizens. Police departments like Ferguson’s and police officers like Wilson can 
continue to misuse their power and target their citizens without fear of repercussions because the 
prosecutors’ office, with whom they collaborate, will refuse to fully and meaningfully prosecute 
cases of police violence.  
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Chapter 2: “Shoot First and Think Later:” How the Supreme Court Created a 
Comprehensive Legal Shield for the Police119 
 
In 2013, a 24-year old black man named Jonathan Ferrell lost control of his car when he was 
driving home in Charlotte, North Carolina. He did not have his phone with him, so he left his car 
and walked to the closest suburban home. He knocked on the door of the house, presumably to 
get help, but the woman inside perceived him as a threat and called 911. Several police cars 
arrived at the scene, under the assumption that Ferrell was attempting to break into a woman’s 
home. As Ferrell walked towards the police, the officers instructed him to get on the ground. 
Presumably fearful, he began to run. One of the officers fired twelve rounds, and ten shots hit 
Ferrell, killing him.120 One year later, in 2014, a black man with a history of mental illness 
named Dennis Grigsby banged on a neighbor’s window in Texas. The neighbors had been 
burglarized before, and they too called the police. Grigsby advanced on the officer who arrived 
at the scene with a metal object, and the officer shot and killed him. The metal object turned out 
to be a spoon.121 These instances are not specific to African Americans. In 2015, a Hispanic man 
named Daniel Covarrubias had been to a hospital in Washington because of hallucinatory drug 
use. Bystanders saw him running and called the police, who found him in a lumber yard. Two 
police officers confronted him and, thinking the cell phone that he took out of his pocket was a 
gun, shot him five times and killed him.122 While these three cases are unique, they also have 
shocking similarities.  
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From a legal standpoint, all three of these cases have one very important fact in common: 
the officers who shot and killed these men felt that their lives were in danger. In two of the cases, 
officers mistook everyday objects for deadly weapons, and shot out of mistaken self-defense. In 
the third case, there was a dispute over whether Ferrell was running at the officers or between 
them in an attempt to get away.123 The justification for the use of force when officers feel 
threatened is a matter of much legal debate. The legal doctrine created by the Supreme Court is 
structured around protecting officers when they act out of fear for their own and others’ lives. 
The doctrine has had a profound influence on police culture, the use of deadly force, and 
heightened skepticism of the legal system by minority communities. Qualified immunity, the 
protection from liability afforded to police officers, is intimately related to America’s racial 
history and modern relations.  
 Law enforcement officers are one of the few state agents given the liberty to use deadly 
force. When officers’ on-duty actions fall within the protection of qualified immunity, the 
officers cannot be legally punished for the consequences of those actions. This protection is 
derived from their position as public officials: when public officials make discretionary decisions 
on behalf of the government, they are entitled to a certain level of protection from legal 
punishment. Just as police officers have the authority of the state to make decisions like whom to 
arrest and when to use force to subdue a threat, they have the protection of the state, within 
certain bounds, if they are wrong about those decisions. When citizens allege that their 
constitutional rights were violated by police officers, those officers are often protected via 
qualified immunity and do not have to answer for the violation.124 
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 Qualified immunity has a long history and it is inextricably connected to race relations. In 
the wake of the American Civil War, Congress passed laws to explicitly protect vulnerable 
African American communities from state and vigilante forces.125 One such law was the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, which was specifically aimed at providing a recourse for legal remedy in 
response to Ku Klux Klan activities.126 Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 later became 
known as Section 1983, and it gives individuals the right to sue state government employees for 
official actions taken. The law states, “Every person who…subjects, or causes to be subjected, 
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law…”127 The law is not a source of rights itself, but codifies the 
ability for individuals who suffer rights violations, as defined in other laws, to seek a remedy 
from the judicial system. A century later, Justice Foster wrote, “The very purpose of §1983 was 
to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s 
federal rights – to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law…”128 
Section 1983 is the legal basis for bringing allegations of illegal conduct against police officers.  
Section 1983 is so broad that, on its face, it seems to allow legal action against any state 
official for deprivation of any constitutional right. However, the courts have consistently 
interpreted it as narrower than its language implies. Specifically, it is read not to conflict with the 
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immunities of state officials, like qualified immunity for police officers. The Court first applied 
qualified immunity to police officers in a case called Pierson v. Ray (1967).129 The case was 
brought to the Court after a group of clergymen, both white and African American, planned a 
prayer pilgrimage to promote bus integration. The group planned to pass through Jackson, 
Mississippi and use the segregated bus facilities, knowing they were likely to be arrested. They 
were indeed arrested, although all the charges were later resolved or dropped. The clergymen 
brought a case against the officers for damages for their false arrest under Section 1983.130 In the 
decision, the Supreme Court stated that Congress’s intent in passing Section 1983 was not to 
undermine understood immunities for public officials. Justice Warren wrote, “The legislative 
record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all common law 
immunities.”131 Common law is a tradition of law, dating back to British colonial law, that is not 
necessarily codified but is understood to be the law by the judicial system. Pierson clarified that 
the common law protection of immunity for police officers was not invalidated by Section 1983. 
The judicial process after the clergymen’s arrests concluded that they did nothing criminal, but 
the police officers who arrested them were protected from liability for making the false arrests 
originally.  
This case established that police officers could not be held liable for making arrests that 
did not later result in criminal penalties. The Court declared, “Under the prevailing view in this 
country, a peace officer who arrests someone with probable cause is not liable for arrest simply 
because the innocence of the suspect is later proved.”132 This demonstrated the basis for the 
Court’s use of qualified immunity to protect police officers: while not an absolute shield, it 
 
129 Pierson v. Ray, (1967) 386 US 547. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Ibid. 
 39 
allowed officers to act within their official capacity without fear of punishment for making a 
mistake in the course of their work. Pierson v. Ray was the first instance in which qualified 
immunity was applied to police officers, but the concept of qualified for government officials far 
predates that decision. The principles underlying qualified immunity have been protecting 
government officials long before the twentieth century. Legal scholars wrote, “…from the 
earliest days of the republic, American law has sometimes shied away from holding government 
officials liable for reasonable mistakes.”133 Because qualified immunity is not a statutory 
protection but a legal construction, the Court has the freedom to manipulate its requirements, and 
thus it has evolved over time.134 
It was not until 1982, in a case called Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982), that the Court 
adjusted the qualified immunity test so as to not base it on intent. This case was about the 
allegedly retaliatory firing of an Air Force employee who sued the presidential aides who were 
involved in the decision to fire him. The Court ultimately ruled that the aides were entitled to 
immunity for their conduct.135 In articulating the parameters of qualified immunity in his 
majority opinion, Justice Powell clearly defined what actions would be protected by immunity. 
Powell wrote, “We therefore hold that government officials performing discretionary functions, 
generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
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known.”136 This changed the test of qualified immunity to an objective standard; instead of 
relying on the intent of the government official in question, it based immunity on whether the 
actions of the official were reasonable. Justice Powell explained exactly why this is a superior 
method for applying qualified immunity:  
 
“By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective terms, we provide no license to 
lawless conduct. The public interest in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims 
remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal reasonableness of an official’s acts. Where an 
official could be expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he 
should be made to hesitate; and a person who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of 
action. But where an official’s duties legitimately require action in which clearly established rights are not 
implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken with independence and without fear of 
consequences.”137 
 
Although this case was not about police conduct specifically, the standard it created extended to 
police officers as well as other government officials. This objective reasonableness standard 
replaced the “malicious and willful” standard as the test to determine whether a police officer 
was entitled to qualified immunity. The objective test in Harlow recognized the paradox inherent 
in the discretion of government officials. Police officers have immense discretion: every time 
they make a decision, they are deciding whether or not to restrict a person’s freedom. If they do 
so mistakenly, they infringe on a person’s rights, but failure to act can result in a person’s ability 
to commit further crime. In the Harlow decision, this choice is referred to as the two evils: the 
choice between false arrest or mistaken restraint. Justice Powell wrote, “The resolution of 
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immunity questions inherently requires a balance between the evils inevitable in any available 
alternative.”138  
 The legal system recognizes that one evil is more likely to result in a lawsuit that can lead 
to punishment for the police officer and has structured the qualified immunity doctrine to 
specifically protect against that likelihood. A legal scholar wrote, “An individual hurt by 
government conduct usually knows exactly whom to blame. The causal connection between the 
plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s conduct is typically clear, and the victim has no trouble 
stating a cause of action. A person injured by official inaction—by the officer who foregoes an 
arrest… often has difficulty identifying any officer responsible for subsequent injury and proving 
a causal connection. As a result, the risk of being sued for erroneous action is much higher than 
the risk of being sued for erroneous inaction…”139 In granting police officers some protection 
from liability, qualified immunity minimizes the deterrent to action that possible lawsuits would 
pose to police officers. In this way, it encourages police action. This can be good, especially 
because people expect the police to help curb crime, or at least facilitate the removal of criminals 
from an environment in which they could continue committing crime. The police should be a 
force that ensures security, and if police officers too often err on the side of inaction due to fear 
of liability, they would not be able to provide safety and security. However, if qualified 
immunity gives too broad a protection for police officers, then constitutional violations can occur 
frequently without punishment. The Supreme Court granted qualified immunity to police officers 
using a standard of reasonableness in Harlow in 1982; ever since, the Court’s decisions on 
qualified immunity for police officers have expanded the doctrine to protect police officers in 
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more scenarios, thereby limiting the ability for citizens to use the courts to protect their 
constitutional rights.  
 In 1986, the Supreme Court heard the case of Malley v. Briggs (1986), and despite ruling 
against the police officers, the Court actually expanded the protections of qualified immunity. 
This case centered around an improper warrant: police officers obtained a warrant to search a 
house for marijuana, but they had not established enough evidence for probable cause, so the 
warrant was improperly signed. The police officer who served the warrant argued that he should 
be protected by qualified immunity because he believed he was serving a proper warrant, but the 
Court found that this did not entitle him to qualified immunity. However, the language the Court 
used in applying the qualified immunity test was broadened from the standard set in Harlow. In 
his majority decision, Justice White wrote: “As the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it 
provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law… Defendants will not be immune if, on an objective basis, it is obvious that no reasonably 
competent officer would have concluded that a warrant should issue; but if officers of reasonable 
competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized.”140 This was more than 
a restatement of Harlow, but a significant change in the qualified immunity doctrine as it relates 
to police officers.  
Harlow created a test that balanced two evils, ostensibly so all police officers could both 
keep communities safe and refrain from over-policing. While the differences in Harlow and 
Malley may be linguistically subtle, the impact of the change in language is substantial. Harlow’s 
standard protects police officers from liability unless their actions violate clearly established 
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statutory or constitutional rights according to a reasonable person.141 Malley’s standard protects 
police officers unless their actions obviously violate rights according to all reasonably competent 
police officers. This new standard in Malley explicitly protects all but the plainly incompetent 
police officers and those who knowingly violate the law.142 As such, under the Malley standard, if 
any reasonable and competent police officers could disagree on whether someone’s rights were 
violated, then the court must find that the police officer who committed the questionable acts has 
immunity from liability. This is different from Harlow’s standard: if a reasonable person could 
believe that the officer’s actions were in violation of a clearly established right, then under 
Harlow, the officer would not be entitled to immunity. This tipped the scales to favor police 
officers over victims of alleged rights violations by broadening the requirements for granting 
immunity. In relegating the denial of immunity only to officers who are “plainly incompetent” or 
“knowingly violate the law,” the Court substantiates the narrative that police officers who 
unjustifiably use force and violate constitutional rights are simply ‘bad apples.’ This mitigates 
the idea that there can be problems with the police system as a whole, especially when it comes 
to police brutality.  
In 1987, just a year after Malley, the Supreme Court took on another case of police 
misconduct and broadened qualified immunity still further. Anderson v. Creighton (1987) was a 
case brought against an FBI agent after he conducted a warrantless search on a house, operating 
on the belief that a suspected bank robber was hiding in the house. There was no bank robber, 
and the residents of the house brought a case against the FBI agent for unreasonable search and 
seizure. The Court found that the agent was entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.143 In 
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the majority opinion, Justice Scalia explained that the qualified immunity test must not be 
applied at a general level; in order for officers to be denied immunity, their actions must violate a 
clearly established right. Justice Scalia emphasizes that the right must not be alleged at an 
abstract, general level because immunity would be denied too often. For example, if plaintiffs 
could argue that an officer violated their rights as codified in the Due Process Clause, then no 
officer would be granted immunity: it would turn qualified immunity into “virtually unqualified 
liability.”144 Instead, in order for an officer to be denied immunity, “in light of preexisting law, 
the unlawfulness must be apparent.”145 Once again, this language broadened the scope of 
qualified immunity. Not only must an officer’s actions violate a clearly established right in order 
for the officer to be denied immunity from liability, but the violation must be apparent from 
preexisting law. This means that previous cases of similar conduct by police officers must have 
been found to be clear constitutional violations in order to demonstrate that all reasonable police 
officers would know that conduct is illegal.  
The result of the preexisting law requirement is that police officers’ blatant but novel 
misconduct is legally protected under qualified immunity. One such example was displayed in a 
case called Robles v. Prince George’s County (2002), a case that made its way to the Fourth 
Circuit. This case began when the police responded to a disorderly noise complaint at 3:30am in 
an apartment in Prince George’s County (PGC) and found several men drinking, including 
Nelson Robles. Robles had an outstanding traffic warrant in the neighboring county, so he was 
arrested. The police officers needed to arrange a prisoner transfer with the police department of 
the neighboring county but arranging an official prisoner transfer is a time-consuming process, 
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so the officers attempted to facilitate the transfer informally, which was not an uncommon 
occurrence. The PGC officers called the neighboring county to get an officer to meet them at the 
border of the two counties, but no one from the neighboring county was available at the time. 
The PGC police officers decided to drive Robles to a deserted parking lot in the neighboring 
county. They tied him to a metal pole and left a note that he had an outstanding warrant out for 
his arrest in that county, and then the officers drove away. They called the neighboring county’s 
non-emergency number to tell them to pick up Robles, but they left out that they were police 
officers and that Robles was tied to a pole. Robles had to stand there for about ten to fifteen 
minutes before officers from the neighboring county showed up and arrested him.146 Robles sued 
the police officers from Prince George’s County for violating his civil rights. The Fourth Circuit 
ruled that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity.  
The Fourth Circuit Court’s decision in this case clearly demonstrates that qualified 
immunity no longer serves to protect citizens by regulating police conduct, but only protects 
police officers from legal repercussions. The Fourth Circuit used the previous Supreme Court 
precedent to arrive at the conclusion that the officers who tied up Robles and left him in a 
parking lot were entitled to qualified immunity for doing so and therefore could not be held 
liable for violating Robles’s constitutional rights. They relied on the test put forth by Anderson to 
formulate their opinion. The justice writing for the majority wrote, “Police officers performing 
discretionary acts generally are granted a qualified immunity and are shielded from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Thus, liability in this case 
turns on what notice the PGC officers had that their conduct violated federal constitutional 
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law.”147 This was interpreted by the Fourth Circuit to mean that the exact conduct that the 
officers did in this case must have been previously ruled to be illegal. The Fourth Circuit justices 
found that there was no such precedent: 
 
“Although the officers’ actions in this instance were foolish and unorthodox, it is also not clear that at the 
time they acted they should have reasonably known that their conduct violated Robles’ constitutional 
rights. The officers should have known, and indeed did know, that they were acting inappropriately. But 
whether they understood their conduct violated clearly established federal law is an altogether different 
question… Going forward, officers are now on notice that the type of Keystone Kop activity that degrades 
those subject to detention and that lacks any conceivable law enforcement purpose implicates federal due 
process guarantees. Going backward, however, and imposing retrospective liability would eviscerate the 
requirement of notice at the core of the qualified immunity doctrine.”148 
 
Justice Scalia explained in Anderson that the qualified immunity test must be applied specifically 
and with reference to preexisting law. In practice, this meant that foolish, unorthodox, 
inappropriate, and degrading police conduct would be shielded from punishment unless a 
previous court decision has found that same conduct to be unlawful. In response to this decision, 
one scholar commented, “The Robles defendants similarly escaped liability, not because there 
was some reasonable basis or legitimate (if misguided) governmental purpose in their actions, 
but because they were lucky enough to find that there were no cases on the books in which the 
right kind of pole was used for the right amount of time.”149 When qualified immunity is so 
expansive as to protect officers from misconduct that has not been already proven illegal, it no 
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longer balances two evils, but protects police from having to answer for their conduct in almost 
every situation.  
Two Supreme Court cases within the last ten years demonstrate that the Supreme Court 
continues to be committed to expanding protections for police officers. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd 
(2011) was a case concerning a native-born U.S. citizen who was arrested as a federal material 
witness after the events of September 11, 2001 but was never called to testify nor charged for a 
crime.150 District of Columbia v. Wesby (2018) was a case of false arrest brought forth by people 
who were partying at an empty, abandoned house.151 In both cases, the Supreme Court 
unanimously ruled that the public officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Justice Scalia 
wrote the majority opinion in Ashcroft, and his linguistic license further expanded qualified 
immunity. Scalia wrote, “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, 
at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every 
reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right. We do not 
require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 
constitutional question beyond debate.”152 In this iteration of the qualified immunity test, Justice 
Scalia adds two modifications: that every reasonable official would have to regard the officer’s 
actions as constitutional violations in order for immunity to be revoked, and that preexisting law 
must demonstrate that the question of the rights violation is beyond debate. In the majority 
opinion in Wesby, the requirements for immunity were further expanded. Justice Thomas wrote, 
“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-
existing precedent. The rule must be settled law, which means it is dictated by controlling 
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authority or a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority. It is not enough that the rule is 
suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable 
official would interpret it to establish the particular rule that the plaintiff seeks to apply. 
Otherwise, the rule is not one that every reasonable official would know.”153 Justice Thomas 
reaffirms Justice Scalia’s qualified immunity test and adds that the preexisting law that makes 
the misconduct clear must be settled law. While these cases do not add substantive requirements 
to the qualified immunity doctrine, they do continue to protect police officers from liability by 
making the requirements to revoke immunity even harder to achieve. At this point, qualified 
immunity has moved far from the balance between the two evils that worried Justice Powell in 
Harlow and has become a nearly all-encompassing shield of immunity for police officers.  
Complicating the qualified immunity doctrine is the doctrine of excessive force. While 
qualified immunity applies to all police conduct, including examples such as serving an improper 
warrant or wrongfully arresting someone, the doctrine of excessive force applies specifically to 
cases in which it is alleged that a police officer used more force than was necessary in a given 
situation. In cases without alleged excessive force, qualified immunity is the only relevant case 
law to determine whether a case should proceed to trial. When a case includes alleged excessive 
force, the qualified immunity test must be interpreted in light of the excessive force doctrine. 
This means that when a judge must determine whether clear preexisting law makes an officer’s 
conduct unlawful, the judge takes into account the standards for determining whether the force 
used was excessive. If the force used is not found to be excessive, then the qualified immunity 
test will most likely entitle the officer to immunity; if the force is excessive, then immunity is 
significantly less likely. When a plaintiff alleges that the officer used excessive force, the 
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qualified immunity test cannot proceed without first determining whether the force was legally 
excessive. There are two Supreme Court cases that established the current test used to determine 
whether police force is excessive: Tennessee v. Garner (1985) and Graham v. Connor (1989).  
Tennessee v. Garner began with a simple burglary. Edward Garner, an African American 
teenager, broke into a house in Memphis, Tennessee. Neighbors called the police, and two 
officers responded to the call. One of the officers, Elton Hymon, went around to the back of the 
house. He saw Garner run across the backyard to a chain-link fence that was six feet tall. His 
flashlight illuminated part of Garner including his face and hands, so the officer knew that 
Garner was young, and he was “reasonably sure” that Garner was unarmed.154 Hymon identified 
himself and yelled for Garner to stop, but Garner began to climb the chain-link fence. Hymon 
shot him in the back of the head, and Garner died later in the hospital. He was found to have 
stolen a purse and ten dollars.155 The Supreme Court ruled against the state, holding that 
Garner’s death amounted to an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The relevant 
Tennessee statute allowed deadly force to be used to stop any fleeing suspects; the Court ruled 
that this statute was unconstitutional. The majority opinion stated that the use of deadly force is 
not reasonable if there is no threat of harm. Justice White wrote, “It is not better that all felony 
suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer 
and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use 
of deadly force to do so. It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but 
the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does not always justify killing 
the suspect. A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him 
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dead.”156 The Tennessee statute was found unconstitutional because it allowed deadly force 
against people who were not a danger to anyone, which the Court found violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Justice White explained that deadly force would be constitutional if the suspect 
posed a threat. He wrote, “Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses 
a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally 
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer 
with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the 
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary 
to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”157 The precondition 
required for police officers to legally use force are very broad: essentially, if suspects are a threat 
to anyone, have a weapon, or there is probable cause to believe they have committed a violent 
crime, then using force is justified.  
In Graham v. Connor (1989), the Supreme Court ruled that the circumstances for the use 
of force are to be evaluated from the perspective of police officers, which expands the 
circumstances in which force is justified. The case began when Dethorne Graham, an African 
American diabetic, felt he was beginning to have an insulin reaction. He knew that he needed to 
raise his blood sugar, so he asked a friend to drive him to a convenience store nearby to get some 
orange juice. However, when Graham entered the convenience store, he saw that the checkout 
line was too long, and so he hurried out of the store and asked his friend to drive him to another 
friend’s house instead. A police officer, Officer Connor, saw him enter the store and leave 
quickly, seemingly without buying anything, and found his behavior suspicious. He pulled over 
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the car to investigate. Graham’s friend told the officer that Graham was having a sugar reaction, 
but the officer ordered them to wait while he found out what had happened at the store. While 
Officer Connor went back to his car to call for backup, Graham got out of the car, ran around it 
in a circle twice, sat down on the curb, and passed out. Backup police officers arrived, and 
despite the friend’s insistence that Graham just needed some sugar, Graham was rolled over and 
his hands were handcuffed behind his back. One officer said, “I’ve seen a lot of people with 
sugar diabetes that never acted like this. Ain’t nothing wrong with the M.F. but drunk. Lock the 
S.B. up.”158 Multiple officers picked Graham up and put him face down on the hood of the car, 
and which point he regained consciousness and asked the officers to check his wallet for the 
diabetes card he carried. In response, one of the officers shoved his face into the hood of the car. 
Then multiple officers grabbed Graham and threw him headfirst into the police car. Meanwhile, 
a friend brought Graham orange juice, but the officers refused to let Graham drink it. When 
Officer Connor finally heard that nothing had happened at the convenience store, the officers 
drove Graham home and let him go. Graham was left with a broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a 
bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and a loud ringing in his ear that never went away.159   
Through the lens of this case, the Court created a standard to judge excessive force that is 
based on objective reasonableness and grounded in the Fourth Amendment.160 Similar to the 
qualified immunity case law, the Court recognized that the excessive force doctrine was a matter 
of balancing opposing interests. It is important both that force not be used improperly and that 
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police officers can use force to protect themselves and others. In the majority opinion, the Court 
acknowledged that officers must make decisions regarding the use of force within a split second. 
Justice Rehnquist wrote, “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgements—in circumstances that are 
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular 
situation.”161 The Court considered the Fourth Amendment’s objective standard and the speed at 
which officers must decide whether or not to act to create the test with which police force must 
be judged. This objective reasonableness standard requires that police use of force must be 
evaluated from the perspective of the officer, in the moment that the action is taken, without the 
benefit of hindsight. In the Graham case, this test was used to find the officer’s use of force was 
justified. The case facts from the perspective of the officer in the moment the action was taken 
and without hindsight display a different story than reality: Officer Connor saw a man run in and 
then out of a convenience store very quickly without buying anything. He pulled over the car, 
and the man started behaving erratically and unpredictably. None of the information that the 
officer learned after the moment of action, like the fact that Graham was having an insulin 
reaction and he did nothing wrong at the convenience store, could be used to evaluate the 
officer’s actions.162 As a result, the treatment that Graham was subjected to while having the 
insulin reaction was deemed justified. This test was created to be objective and reasonable and 
attempted to balance the two evils of excessive force. However, in taking into account the 
precarious position of police officers, it mandates that the jury must view police actions from 
their perspective. If this perspective conflicts with the truth, the actual facts of the case must be 
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disregarded in favor of the facts as presented by the officer. When judging a case based on what 
a police officer could reasonably believe was happening, instead of based on what actually 
happened, it can excuse actions like in Graham’s case, in which a diabetic was brutalized for 
having an insulin reaction in view of a police officer. It can also justify police officers who shoot 
people who they believe were carrying a weapon, and therefore were posing a threat to others, 
even if in actuality they were unarmed.  
The doctrine of qualified immunity and the doctrine of excessive force must be used in 
conjunction to evaluate cases in which police officers are alleged to have used excessive force. In 
order for police officers’ immunity to be revoked, the officers’ conduct must clearly be in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, which is determined by the Graham test, in light of 
preexisting, settled law. Scott v. Harris (2007) provides an example of this standard’s high 
threshold. The case began when Victor Harris, and African American man, was driving in 
Georgia at seventy-three miles per hour on a fifty-five miles per hour street. Deputy Timothy 
Scott saw him speeding and tried to pull him over, but Harris increased his speed and drove 
away. Scott and multiple other police cars began chasing Harris. After six minutes and nearly ten 
miles of pursuing Harris’s car, Scott asked permission from his supervisor to engage in a 
Precision Intervention Technique, which is a method of causing a fleeing car to spin to a stop. He 
received permission, and Scott pushed his bumper to the back of Harris’s car. Harris lost control, 
and the car flew off the road, down an embankment, and turned over. Harris was rendered a 
quadriplegic from the crash.163  
The Court ruled that Scott was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court evaluated the 
threat that Harris’s behavior posed to the responding officers and bystanders and found that in 
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light of these factors, Scott’s response was objectively reasonable. Justice Scalia wrote in his 
majority decision that the Court had to weigh the larger probability of injuring or killing the 
singular driver of the vehicle against the smaller probability of potentially injuring or killing 
several innocent bystanders, as this was the dilemma presented to Scott in the moment that he 
took action. 164 To properly weigh these concerns, Justice Scalia explained that Harris’s 
culpability should also be considered. He wrote, “It was respondent, after all, who intentionally 
placed himself and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-speed flight 
that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that Scott confronted. Multiple police cars, 
with blue lights flashing and sirens blaring, had been chasing respondent for nearly 10 miles, but 
he ignored their warning to stop. By contrast, those who might have been harmed had Scott not 
taken the action he did were entirely innocent. We have little difficulty in concluding it was 
reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.”165 Garner established that police officers can 
use force when someone presents a threat to the officers or to the public, and Graham instructs 
the Court to evaluate the case from the perspective of the officer. In this case, from Deputy 
Scott’s perspective, Harris’s driving was a threat to others, so the Court found that Scott forcing 
him off the road was an objectively reasonable response to the danger.166 Given that Scott’s 
conduct was objectively reasonable, it did not violate any clearly established law, which meant 
Scott was entitled to qualified immunity.  
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In addition to requiring that cases be examined from the officer’s perspective, Graham v. 
Connor firmly established that Section 1983 cases must be evaluated under the Fourth 
Amendment. Before Graham, police use of force cases could be judged based on the Fourth 
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment, in which the Due Process clause and the Equal 
Protection clause provide a source of collective rights and protection for groups who experience 
collective inequality. After Graham was decided, cases were evaluated using the Fourth 
Amendment, which protects an individual’s right against search and seizure by the government. 
This was a substantial change: before Graham, only 28 percent of federal cases about police 
excessive force included an evaluation of the Fourth Amendment. After Graham, that rose to 
90.4 percent.167 On the other hand, discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment fell from 40 percent 
before Graham to 26 percent after, and of the 26 percent of cases in which it was discussed, 82.8 
percent of those cases rejected the victim’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.168 This suggests that 
Graham substantially changed case law on this issue. As two scholars reported, “…the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Graham produced rather than mirrored any consensus or normative 
understanding regarding police excessive force claims being rendered as Fourth Amendment 
concerns.”169 The Court’s decision in Graham was not a reflection of common practices in the 
courts at the time, but a dramatic change in how the reasonableness of police officers must be 
judged. Under the Fourth Amendment, all cases must be viewed individually. If cases were to be 
adjudicated under the Fourteenth Amendment, arguments could be made based on the collective 
rights of groups.  
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When a police officer uses excessive force against an African American individual, 
Graham requires that the case be viewed as a whole, rather than part of a larger practice of police 
force against African Americans. After Graham, only 17.2 percent of cases mentioned the race 
of the victim.170 This displays “constitutional colorblindness,” or the practice of ignoring the 
racial aspect of the pattern of police use of force.171 Due to the decision in Graham, Section 1983 
claims cannot be made under the Fourteenth Amendment, meaning that the legal system cannot 
evaluate the larger pattern of police violence against African Americans. The pattern of police 
violence against African American communities cannot color the court’s decisions in these 
cases. Every case must be viewed from the perspective of the police officer, substantially 
preferencing police officers’ protection above the collective experience of African Americans. 
Not only does this separate each victim from accessing a remedy based on a history of repeated 
injustice against the group to which they belong, but it also frames each officer who does not 
qualify for immunity as a rogue cop or bad apple; not part of a bigger problem, but as an 
individual whose actions are unconnected to the broader history of racial injustices. The author 
of the study strongly stated the effect of Graham on the legal system’s treatment of these cases:  
 
“By individualizing police violence and scaling it down from a structural matter steeped in centuries of 
racial tensions to an individual dispute between officer and citizen, the Fourth Amendment has been used to 
depoliticize, deracialize, decontextualize, and ahistoricize a distinctive racial justice issue concerning the 
disproportionate use of force against people of color. This individualizing dynamic not only warps our 
understanding of the causes and consequences of police violence, but often leaves victims without any 
remedy.”172  
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The Court in Graham effectively eliminated the possibility for courts to view police brutality as 
a whole, which would have allowed for race-conscious conclusions to be made and remedies to 
be granted. Instead, the Court’s precedent requires isolating each case from its historical context, 
which does not allow for groups to claim collective violations of their rights. This decision 
effectively isolated the Court from the larger societal patterns of disproportionate police violence 
and removed the legal system from being a means for addressing and changing those patterns.  
 The Supreme Court’s choice to base Graham on the Fourth Amendment and the 
incremental broadening of the qualified immunity doctrine are representative of the Court’s 
ideological shift after Chief Justice Earl Warren stepped down in 1969. The Warren Court was 
known for its “judicial activism” and turned the Court into “an independent and aggressive 
guarantor of constitutional rights.”173 This ended with the Warren Court, however, and the next 
three Chief Justices—Burger, Rehnquist, and the current Chief Justice John Roberts—were all 
appointed by Republican presidents with very different ideas about the role of the Court. The 
agenda of the Court shifted from protecting civil liberties, especially those of minorities, to 
limiting laws that were created to counteract the effects of historical discrimination and shift 
power to state governments instead of the federal government. Between 1965 and 2019, 
Republican coalitions in elected positions appointed likeminded, conservative individuals to 
unelected positions like the Supreme Court. These unelected justices, unaccountable to the 
public, were able to decide controversial civil rights cases in favor of increasing state power at 
the expense of individual liberties, following an agenda that elected officials were unable to 
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implement through legislation for fear of public backlash that could result in losing reelection.174 
This is reflected in the evolution of the Court’s decisions in qualified immunity cases. A Ninth 
Circuit judge explained that the Supreme Court has adopted “…a strictly conservative and often 
extreme ideology that elevates the interests of state courts and local officials above those of the 
individual and dictates the Court’s decisions whenever it considers the cases of persons who seek 
the enforcement of their constitutional rights through habeas corpus or §1983.”175 The Court’s 
reluctance to grant claims under Section 1983 has resulted in the expansion of the qualified 
immunity doctrine from being a balance of two evils to an all-encompassing legal shield for 
police officers that fails to protect the rights of individuals.  
 In Kisela v. Hughes (2018), the Court again ruled in favor of a police officer, granting 
him qualified immunity for shooting a woman with a history of mental illness. The opinion in 
this case was written per curiam and Justice Sotomayor wrote a strong dissent (joined by Justice 
Ginsburg). This case started when someone called the police and reported a woman who was 
acting erratically and hacking at a tree with a kitchen knife. Officer Kisela and two other officers 
responded and found Chadwick in the driveway of her house and then Hughes, who matched the 
description of the woman acting erratically, exiting the house holding a knife. There was a chain-
link fence between the two women and the police officers. Hughes stopped about six feet from 
Chadwick, and all three officers told her to drop the knife. She looked calm, but did not comply, 
and Officer Kisela dropped to the ground to avoid the bar of the chain-link fence and shot 
Hughes four times. Then the officers jumped the fence and handcuffed Hughes. The time elapsed 
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between the officers seeing Chadwick and Officer Kisela shooting Hughes was less than a 
minute.176 Using the standards mandated by Garner and Graham, the Court evaluated whether, 
from the officer’s perspective, Hughes was a threat. The majority opinion found that Kisela 
reasonably believed that Hughes was a danger to Chadwick. Although the officers were not in 
danger, Garner allows police officers to use force to protect the safety of other people, and 
Hughes was only a few feet from Chadwick and not complying with demands to drop the knife. 
Kisela knew that a concerned citizen had called the police because Hughes was hacking at a tree 
with a knife, and he had only seconds to assess the danger Hughes posed to Chadwick. The 
majority opinion stated, “This is far from an obvious case in which any competent officer would 
have known that shooting Hughes to protect Chadwick would violate the Fourth Amendment.”177 
The Court also found that there were no clear cases in which a police officer acted similarly and 
their conduct was ruled unconstitutional, which did not make the officer’s actions 
unquestionably unconstitutional. Applying the relevant precedents, both in the doctrine of 
excessive force and the doctrine of qualified immunity, the Court ruled that Kisela’s actions were 
not apparently unlawful, and therefore he was entitled to qualified immunity.  
 Justice Sotomayor disagreed. She wrote, “If [the] account of Kisela’s conduct sounds 
unreasonable, that is because it was. And yet, the Court today insulates that conduct from 
liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity, holding that Kisela violated no clearly 
established law.”178 In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor reiterated the facts of the case, adding a 
few that the majority opinion left out: before Hughes was shot, she was unmoving and seemed 
“composed and content” about six feet away from Chadwick. She was holding the knife down 
 
176 Kisela v. Hughes. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. (Internal citations omitted.) 
 60 
and the blade was not facing Chadwick. Justice Sotomayor also emphasized that Hughes had 
done nothing illegal, was not suspected of a crime, and did not raise the knife to threaten 
Chadwick or anyone else. She did not seem to be aware of the officers at all. Moreover, the two 
other officers who arrived on the scene with Officer Kisela did not choose to shoot; one of them 
testified that they wanted to continue talking to Hughes to get her to drop the knife. Kisela was 
the only one who thought force was necessary at that time, and he shot without giving any 
warning that he was about to do so. To determine that a police officer is entitled to qualified 
immunity, the Court must evaluate that no reasonable officer would have acted differently in that 
situation. Justice Sotomayor argued that the presence of two other police officers in the exact 
same situation as Officer Kisela, yet who chose not to fire their weapons, proves that not all 
reasonable officers would not have used deadly force when faced with the same scenario. This 
should be proof that Kisela’s actions were unreasonable.  
Justice Sotomayor disparaged the Court’s interpretation of qualified immunity: she wrote 
that the Court “routinely displays an unflinching willingness” to reverse decisions in which 
lower courts wrongfully denied an officer qualified immunity, but rarely acts in the reverse to 
remove qualified immunity when it was wrongfully given.179 The effect of this on jurisprudence 
is significant. Sotomayor wrote, “Such a one-sided approach to qualified immunity transforms 
the doctrine into an absolute shield for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of 
the Fourth Amendment.”180 Finally, she finished her dissent with a powerfully worded statement 
about the Court’s interpretation of the doctrine of qualified immunity and its impact on all 
Americans. She wrote, “The majority today exacerbates that troubling asymmetry. Its decision is 
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not just wrong on the law; it also sends an alarming signal to law enforcement officers and the 
public. It tells officers that they can shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably 
unreasonable conduct will go unpunished. Because there is nothing right or just under the law 
about this, I respectfully dissent.”181  
 Justice Sotomayor’s dissent proved telling. The Court created qualified immunity for 
police officers to be a balance between evils, but the recent decisions demonstrate that all 
balance has been lost: the qualified immunity that is supposed to allow police officers to protect 
both themselves and the public has become almost an absolute immunity that excuses any 
misconduct. These decisions made by the highest court mean that police officers are rarely held 
accountable in any court. Police violence that seems patently unreasonable to the average 
observer has become justifiable in the eyes of the law because it must be evaluated from the 
officer’s perspective, without the benefit of hindsight, and in light of preexisting settled law. 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent emphasizes the danger of these legal doctrines: not only do they 
excuse past police violence, but it communicates to police officers that they will be shielded 
from liability for their actions, so they need not fear consequences for acting with excessive 
violence. This makes for a problematic if not dangerous police force.  
This is something that should concern every citizen in every jurisdiction, not just for 
poor, urban, majority-minority areas. The doctrine of qualified immunity protects police officers 
no matter the race of the victim. The law will favor police officers no matter who the officers 
target with excessive force. However, these doctrines hurt African Americans most. Because 
African American citizens are disproportionately likely to be stopped and arrested by police 
officers (2.5 times more likely to be arrested than white citizens), and much more likely to be 
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shot and killed by police officers (21 times more likely than white citizens), it follows that 
African Americans are hurt most by the lack of access to legal remedies for constitutional 
violations.182 The Court’s binding precedent that excessive force cases must be adjudicated under 
the Fourth Amendment and not the Fourteenth further hurts African Americans, because it 
precludes a chance at a collective remedy. The Supreme Court’s decisions have forced the legal 
system to evaluate each instance of police force individually, instead of addressing the violent 
and deadly pattern of police violence against black people. In her dissent for a different case in 
regard to police conduct for searches and seizures, Justice Sotomayor explained that the pattern 
of black men stopped without suspicion and searched should not be viewed on an individual 
level. She wrote, “We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted by 
police are ‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal, warn 
us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.”183 The way the legal system regards police 
violence against African Americans—by isolating the incidents and painting the officers as ‘bad 
apples’ instead of acknowledging the larger problem—reinforces the state perpetuated violence 
against African Americans. At best, the law excuses violence, and at worst, it allows police 
officers a license to kill.  
 The three cases referenced at the beginning of this chapter were representative of a larger 
pattern. In 2019, 1004 people were shot and killed by the police, and at least 23 percent of those 
people were black.184 African Americans make up about 13 percent of the country’s population, 
but in the past five years, at least 24 percent of people shot and killed by police officers were 
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black.185 And yet, convictions for police officers are incredibly rare. Since 2005, only 35 police 
officers have been convicted for on-duty shootings.186 This is not surprising given that the law is 
on the side of the officers. The police officers who killed Jonathan Ferrell, Dennis Grigsby, 
Daniel Covarrubias, and many more people who were unarmed and unthreatening, needed only 
to claim fear, either for themselves or other people nearby. The law is such that if a person poses 
a threat to police officers or bystanders, officers can legally use deadly force to prevent the 
person from hurting others. Moreover, the law requires that the circumstances be evaluated from 
the point of view of the officers and without the benefit of hindsight, so the threat does not need 
to be real, it just needs to be perceived. Dennis Grigsby was brandishing a spoon when he died, 
and Daniel Covarrubias was holding his cell phone. Jonathan Ferrell’s only supposed weapon 
was his body, and he was (arguably) running at the police officers. None of these three men 
posed a real significant threat to any of the police officers who killed them, but nonetheless, the 
officers’ use of force was found justifiable because of their fear. All the police officers had to say 
in their defense was that they were fearful for their lives because of what they thought was 
happening, and their deadly use of force against these men were excused.   
 The Supreme Court has incrementally yet substantially expanded the legal protections 
afforded to police officers. It adapted the institution of the criminal justice system itself to 
excuse, allow, and even perpetuate violence against black people. The Court’s standard of 
“objective reasonableness” demands that every reasonable officer recognize an action as 
unconstitutional, but the way this works does not seem objective or reasonable. The point of 
view of the police officers is the only perspective from which deadly force cases can be judged, 
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which seems incredibly subjective, and the qualified immunity test repeatedly excuses ostensibly 
unreasonable actions. The Court recognizes that officers must know at least the generalities of 
the legal doctrine in order to act without unnecessary and excessive force, and therein lies the 
biggest problem. As Justice Sotomayor wrote, the Supreme Court told police officers they can 
“shoot first and think later,” and as long as they articulate their fear in the aftermath, their 
conduct will not be punished. This is nothing less than the Supreme Court knowingly and 
outwardly communicating to police officers that they can kill citizens and walk away without 
consequences.  
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Chapter 3: A “Distorting Lens:” How Jury Biases Cause Unjust Verdicts in Police Use of 
Force Cases187 
 
In 2015, Samuel DuBose, a 43-year old African American man, was pulled over by a University 
of Cincinnati police officer because he did not have a front license plate on his car.188 Officer 
Ray Tensing approached his car and asked to see his driver’s license, which DuBose admitted he 
did not have with him and asked the officer to run his name in the system. Officer Tensing 
instructed DuBose to get out of the car. Tensing attempted to open the car door, and DuBose 
pulled it shut and restarted the engine. Tensing reached inside the car in an attempt to restrain 
DuBose and pulled out his gun.189 For the first minute and fifty seconds of the interaction, both 
men were calm and polite. Within five seconds after the car was restarted, Tensing reached 
through the window and shot Samuel DuBose point blank in the head.190 Officer Tensing was 
never convicted for DuBose’s death. His case stands out because he was indicted by a grand jury 
and his case went to trial, not once but twice. Two separate juries failed to convict him for 
DuBose’s death.191 The reason for this result, and the final reason why it is so difficult to hold 
police officers accountable for deadly violence against African American men, lies in the jury. 
The system of leaving the decision to twelve ordinary Americans fails to be an unbiased, equally 
balanced method of evaluating evidence in these cases to come to just conclusions.  
 The trial by jury is one of the cornerstones of the American legal system. Hailed as the 
most democratic method for determining justice, juries are supposed to be made up of twelve 
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citizens, randomly selected from a group representative of the community, that neutrally and 
with an open mind hear a criminal case. While sentencing is the responsibility of judges, the 
verdict—deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty—is in the hands of people with no 
legal training or background. The job of juries is to determine the facts of a case. While the law 
is a matter for the judge to determine, the jury must apply the law to the case in question.192 
Juries must work together to reach a verdict; unanimity is required for a conviction.193 The right 
to a trial by jury in a criminal case is codified in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. It 
states, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed…”194 
The jury is an inherently democratic idea, in which every citizens should have the opportunity to 
serve. In describing the jury, Thomas Jefferson asserted that it must not be exclusionary. He 
wrote, “Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best be omitted in the Legislative or 
Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them out of the Legislative.”195  
Yet, the American jury process historically excluded much of the population.196 It began 
as an inherently undemocratic institution, in that it only represented a small portion of 
Americans. It was not until 1880 that the Supreme Court ruled that participation on juries must 
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not be restricted only to white citizens.197 Despite this decision, local officials easily 
circumvented the ruling, using various creative strategies to ensure that no black citizens were 
chosen to serve on juries.198 In 1968, the Jury Selection and Service Act standardized jury 
selection methods across the United States. It also codified certain virtues in the jury: that jurors 
must be “selected at random from a fair cross section of the community,” and that “all citizens 
shall have the opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries.”199 But the jury 
system continues to perpetuate the historical tradition of failing to proportionately select African 
American citizens for juries.  
The process of creating the jury pool, which is the list of citizens who might be called to 
serve on a jury, is a flawed process that disproportionately excludes minorities from the chance 
to serve on juries. The formation of the jury pool today begins with every citizen filling out a 
questionnaire. This is already a limiting practice: questionnaires are sent to citizens who are 
listed on voter registration bases and driver’s license databases, so those who are not on either 
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list are never given the questionnaire.200 Minority populations are less likely to be registered to 
vote or have a driver’s license, and are therefore less likely to be included in jury pools.201 
Additionally, minority populations are less likely to have a permanent address, so even if they 
are included on these lists, they may not get the questionnaire through the mail.202 From the 
completed and returned questionnaires, some people are excused or disqualified from jury 
duty.203 Common reasons for disqualification include the inability to speak English or a criminal 
record.204 These characteristics are also more prevalent in minority communities.205 It is common 
for counties not to provide childcare and have very low compensation for jurors, which results in 
further underrepresentation of low-income and unemployed citizens, many of whom are people 
of color.206 The citizens remaining on the list after this process make up the jury pool. A 
predominant reason why juries are overpopulated by white citizens and underrepresent racial 
minorities is due to the system through which jury pools are formed.  
 The next step in the process to forming a jury is creating a venire, a step that provides 
lawyers the opportunity to intentionally discriminate against potential jurors of color. A venire is 
a panel of prospective jurors, usually ranging from thirty to sixty people, who are summoned to 
the courthouse for a specific case.207 The panel undergoes a voir dire, during which the attorneys 
for both parties and the judge conduct a pretrial interview of the jurors. Each voir dire is 
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different, as the judge sets the rules for how it must be conducted.208 Based on the answers given 
by potential jurors during the voir dire, attorneys can challenge the inclusion of particular people 
on the jury. There are two methods that an attorney can use to challenge prospective jurors: the 
challenge for cause and the peremptory challenge.209 When attorneys challenge a person for 
cause, it is because they believe there is a reason why that person will be unable to come to an 
unbiased conclusion. For example, that potential juror might know one of the parties in the case 
or might have a financial interest in the outcome of the case. Each attorney can submit an 
unlimited number of challenges for cause and the judge decides whether to grant or reject the 
challenge. If the challenge is granted, the person is excused from the case and will not become a 
juror.210 The second method of challenging the inclusion of a person on the jury is the 
peremptory challenge. This allows an attorney to remove a juror without providing any 
explanation.211 Each jurisdiction allows a different number of peremptory challenges. The 
peremptory challenge is viewed as a necessary aspect of jury selection in order to have an 
impartial jury: it allows attorneys to excuse potential jurors whom they feel will not be able to 
come to an unbiased decision, even if the attorney cannot articulate why they believe that to be 
the case.212 
 Of course, with discretion comes the possibility of abuse and discrimination. In 1965, the 
Supreme Court heard allegations that discriminatory peremptory challenges violated defendants’ 
right to a fair trial. In this case, Robert Swain was an African American man convicted of rape in 
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Alabama. 26 percent of the county in which he was tried was black, but venires averaged only 10 
to 15 percent black representation, and not a single black person had been selected to serve on a 
jury in the county since 1950. In Swain’s case, eight black people were on the venire; two were 
exempt for cause and six were excused using peremptory challenges, which left no African 
Americans on his jury.213 The Court ruled that while the venire should represent an accurate 
distribution of the community, a defendant “is not entitled to a jury containing members of his 
race.”214 In other words, any particular jury is not required to be representative of the 
community; only the venire from which the members of the jury are chosen must be. The Court 
did acknowledge that a pattern of systematically removing prospective jurors of one race is a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause.215 However, the process the Court required for 
determining whether a violation occurred was overly burdensome. To challenge a state’s use of 
peremptory challenges, the defendant had to show “consistent and systematic discriminatory use 
of peremptory challenges by the state.”216 This standard was so burdensome that Swain’s case 
failed to meet it.217 In this racially charged case, all eight potential black jurors were 
systematically struck from the jury, and for six of the challenges no reason was given for their 
exclusion. If this did not demonstrate a consistent and discriminatory practice of exclusion of 
black people, the standard was set inaccessibly high. The Swain test clearly would not have 
overturned the discriminatory exclusion of one black juror, as it failed to overturn peremptory 
challenges against six. A remedy that does not correct for discrimination towards even one 
potential black juror is not a sufficient remedy for discrimination on juries.  
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 Twenty years later, the Supreme Court heard Batson v. Kentucky (1986) which amended 
the Swain precedent to ease the burden of proof and provides the standard still used today to 
determine whether particular peremptory challenges are constitutional violations. The case began 
when James Batson was indicted in Kentucky for burglary. The prosecutor excused all of the 
potential black jurors from the venire using peremptory strikes, which resulted in an all-white 
jury.218 In Batson, the Court found that the burden set in Swain was too high. Justice Powell 
wrote, “Since this interpretation of Swain has placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof, 
prosecutors’ peremptory challenges are now largely immune from constitutional scrutiny.”219 
The new standard set forth in Batson required a three step process to determine the legality of the 
peremptory challenge: first, the defendant must show a prima facie case for discriminatory use of 
peremptory strikes. If that is successful, the burden shifts to the prosecutor in the second step to 
provide a race-neutral reason for excusing the potential jurors. The third step is determining if 
the reason is “pretextual;” if so, the peremptory challenge is found to be illegal.220 Essentially, 
what a Batson challenge comes down to is whether a judge finds the prosecutor’s race-neutral 
reason for dismissing the juror to be dubious, and if so, the challenge will not be allowed.221   
 The Batson decision was meant to reduce racial discrimination in peremptory challenges, 
but evidence shows that attorneys still take race into account when selecting jurors.222 In his 
concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall predicted this would be the case. He wrote, “The 
decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury 
selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges 
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entirely.”223 Instead reducing racial discrimination in jury selection, Batson only forced attorneys 
to provide race-neutral reasons for their peremptory strikes. A Supreme Court case in 1995, 
Purkett v. Elem (1995), demonstrated just how easy that is. In Purkett, the Court evaluated two 
peremptory challenges for discrimination. The prosecutor who struck the two African American 
jurors stated that it was because their hair was too long. The prosecutor argued, “He appeared to 
me to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder 
length, curly, unkempt hair… I don’t like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both 
of them.”224 This was a thinly veiled attempt at distinguishing those two black jurors without 
directly stating their race, and the Court accepted his reasoning as race-neutral. The Court’s per 
curiam opinion stated that the required race-neutral reasons did not have to be “persuasive, or 
even plausible.”225 As long as the reason is face-specific and not explicitly stating the potential 
juror’s race, it does not need to be related to the case at all: reasons such as “the prospective juror 
stared, hesitated before responding, or failed to make eye contact” or “their professions, clothing, 
or the way they wore their hair” all pass the Batson review.226 This means that any creative 
attorney can excuse a black juror and give a vague, unrelated reason for their decision.  
The landmark Batson decision fails to live up to its intention: to diversify juries. As a 
scholar wrote, “Batson… poses no genuine impediment to prosecutorial attempts to remove 
minorities from venires.”227 It is too easy to provide a race-neutral reason for dismissing a black 
potential juror, and it is too hard to appeal an unfavorable Batson decision.228 While Batson fails 
 
223 Batson v. Kentucky. 
224 Purkett v. Elem, (1995) 514 U.S. 765. 
225 Ibid.  
226 Marder, Nancy S, “Batson Revisited,” Iowa Law Review 97, no. 5 (2012): 1585–1612, 1590, 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/P?h=hein.journals/ilr97&i=1595. 
227 Gau, Jacinta M, “A Jury of Whose Peers? The Impact of Selection Procedures on Racial Composition and the 
Prevalence of Majority-White Juries,” 77. 
228 Appealing a Batson challenge to the appellate court is unlikely to result in a change. While trial court judges see 
the challenge happen in their courtroom, appellate court judges must get all the facts from a transcript, which 
 73 
to adequately provide a remedy for discriminatory peremptory challenges, it is not the main 
reason why juries are not as diverse as the community they are supposed to represent. The 
prosecution and the defense typically use their peremptory strikes on people of opposite races, so 
the impact of peremptory strikes on jury diversity tends to balance out between the two sides.229 
However, given the disproportionately low representation of racial minorities on venires, any 
peremptory strikes of black potential jurors have disproportionately large impacts on the racial 
diversity of juries.230 
 Diverse juries often result in better outcomes in a trial, no matter the circumstances of the 
case. When cases are racially charged, it is even more important for juries to be diverse. Studies 
have concluded that diverse groups, broadly defined, produce better performances and are more 
apt at decision making.231 Racially diverse juries can, and often do, influence trial outcomes.232 
Justice Marshall best described what is lost when juries are homogeneous. He explained, “When 
any large and identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is 
to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the 
range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume that the 
excluded group will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion 
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deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any 
case that might be presented.”233 The benefits of racially diverse juries are only attained when 
there is more than one person of color on the jury. The inclusion of only one African American 
person on a jury often leads to tokenism. Token minorities, such as a single black juror on an 
otherwise entirely white jury, experience marginalization, alienation, and intimidation.234 The 
benefits of diverse juries require a meaningful numerical minority population.  
 When police officers are on trial for shooting unarmed black men, the racial make-up of 
the juries are especially important because white jurors are more likely to have implicit biases 
against African American men that will influence their decision-making. Implicit bias is not 
synonymous with racism; a person with implicit biases against black people is not necessarily 
racist. Implicit biases are like “distorting lenses” created by the way brains function and the 
structure of society.235 Human brains are flexible and actually change in response to experiences 
and environmental cues, which is called neuroplasticity.236 Brains adapt in response to people’s 
surrounding environment in order to best make sense of the world. One way in which the brain 
does this is by categorizing stimuli. In order to understand the chaotic world in which we live, 
the brain recognizes patterns and categorizes new information into already existing groups.237 
This is not an inherently harmful practice; for example, it means that a person who dislikes 
apples does not need to try every apple to find out if it tastes good, but can generalize from the 
knowledge of what apples have looked and tasted like for them in the past.238 However, 
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categorization can lead to bias. Stereotypes are built through categorization, as experiences or 
environmental cues are generalized to apply to all people with the same identifying 
characteristics. The brain makes automatic assumptions about people it does not know based on 
these patterns, which results in prejudice—literally pre-judging a person.239 The process of 
making these assumptions is known as bias, and it can occur “unintentionally,” “unconsciously,” 
“effortlessly,” and “in a matter of milliseconds.”240 A psychological scholar wrote, “…these 
associations can take hold of us no matter our values, no matter our conscious beliefs, no matter 
what kind of person we wish to be in the world.”241  
Implicit biases can distort thoughts and shape realities without our awareness of their 
existence. One of the most powerful racial stereotypes in American collective consciousness is 
the association between blackness and criminality.242 This negative stereotype is so powerful that 
it can even change memories: studies show that information that is consistent with stereotypes 
can be recalled with more ease than stereotype-inconsistent information.243 Even worse, the mind 
is more likely to create false memories that are consistent with stereotypes. Information that is 
stereotype-consistent is loosely encoded in the brain, so when people try to recall this 
information, they can create new memories of things that never happened but align with the 
stereotype without realizing it.244 These tendencies are particularly problematic for jurors to 
exhibit during a racially-charged trial, like when a white police officer stands accused of 
unnecessarily killing an unarmed black man. The job of the jury is to determine the facts of the 
case; this makes the ability for brains to generate stereotype-consistent false memories very 
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dangerous. In fact, people serving on a jury are particularly likely to generate false memories in 
this way because they must evaluate so much information in a short span of time. This leads to 
“cognitive depletion,” which results in a higher likelihood of more memory errors.245  
In cases in which police officers shot unarmed black men, much of the verdict rests on 
the reasonableness of the officer’s fear. If the jury believes the officers truly feared for either 
their lives or the lives of others, then the law requires that the jury regard the officer’s use of 
deadly force as justified. Implicit biases increase the likelihood that jurors will view the officer’s 
fear as reasonable because of the stereotyped perceptions of black men: African American men 
are perceived to be more threatening and dangerous than white men. One study specifically 
examined people’s recollections of aggressive behavior of white and black men; the study 
participants were more likely to recall the black man’s aggressive behavior than the white man’s 
aggressive behavior, even just fifteen minutes after reading the facts of the scenario.246 The 
jurors in cases of on-duty shootings are given descriptions of events of the case and sometimes 
videos of the actual event. This study implies that the jurors will remember any acts of 
aggression from the black victim more readily than any of the white police officer’s actions, 
which will make the jury more likely to believe the officer’s fear of the black man. Participants 
in the study were also found to be more likely to generate false memories of black men’s 
behavior in a way that reflected poorly on them, than they did for the white men.247 If jurors are 
both remembering aggressive behavior of black men and generating false memories that hurt 
their opinion of the black men, they are certainly more likely to view the police officers’ fear and 
subsequent use of force as reasonable.  
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Additionally, non-black people regularly perceive young black men as “taller, heavier, 
stronger, more muscular, and more capable of causing physical harm” than young white men of 
the same size.248 Study participants perceived black men as more capable of doing harm than 
white men, even between two groups of the same size, with actual size differences controlled 
for.249 If juries are completely or predominately made up of white people, the jury as a whole 
will be susceptible to the findings in these studies.250 They will be more likely to believe the 
black man shot by the police officer was a threat to the officer, meaning the deadly force used 
was justified. Further studies have mimicked reality to study people’s reactions to police 
officers’ use of deadly force and found that found that participants rated the use of force against 
black men as more justified than against white men.251 Juries presented with cases of on duty 
shootings in which white officers shoot unarmed black men will be unconsciously biased to 
favor the officers’ arguments that deadly force was used justifiably. White jurors, in particular, 
have implicit biases that predispose them to believe that officers who use deadly force against 
unarmed African American men did so justifiably.  
The jury system is meant to be an essential part of a fair trial for a defendant. The jurors 
are supposed to be randomly chosen from a representative sample of the population, given all the 
facts of the case, and tasked with determining a just verdict. But instead of twelve randomly 
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selected, diverse, open-minded jurors, verdicts are determined all too often by a group of white 
citizens with implicit preconceptions and biases that interfere with their ability to decide a 
verdict fairly. One author wrote, “Looking at the theory and the mechanics of jury selection, it 
becomes apparent that the system is based on an idea that, in turn, requires that at least one of the 
following conditions be fulfilled: (a) that jurors appear in court in tabula rasa form, neutral and 
untainted by previous experience; (b) that jurors can leave their pretrial biases at the courthouse 
door, making fair and objective judgements despite their predispositions; or (c) that those 
candidates for jury service who are irrevocably prejudiced will be detected and eliminated at 
some point during the selection process.”252 Given both the process of the jury selection system 
and the psychological processes in our brains, meeting any of these three conditions is 
exceedingly difficult for cases involving police shootings of unarmed black men. The jury 
selection process excludes a significant portion of the racial minority population before anyone is 
even summoned to the courthouse, and dismissals of potential jurors during the voir dire process 
severely limits the possibility of a diverse, representative jury. Furthermore, jurors—particularly 
white jurors, who so often make up the entire or at least most of the jury—carry unconscious and 
implicit racial biases that predisposes them to find the police officer’s actions justifiable. For 
twelve jurors to be truly representative of the community and to overcome their psychological 
predispositions to hear a case of this nature with a truly open mind is nearly impossible. This 
means that, if a police officer shoots and kills an unarmed African American man and is charged 
by a prosecutor or a grand jury and is denied summary judgement based on qualified immunity, 
the system will still likely protect the officer: the process for selecting the jury will 
disproportionately exclude racial minorities, the jury will be made up of mostly white citizens 
 
252 Kassin, Saul M., and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, The American Jury on Trial, 26. 
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with implicit biases against African Americans, and the verdict will hinge upon whether these 
biased, white citizens believe the officer when he says he feared the black man was attacking 
him.  
The two trials that failed to convict Ray Tensing, the officer who killed Samuel DuBose, 
demonstrate how the supposedly democratic jury system is unable to fairly adjudicate these 
cases. After Tensing killed DuBose, protests ignited in Cincinnati, demanding justice for Samuel 
DuBose. It was not until a year after the shooting that questionnaires were mailed to the citizens 
of Hamilton County with the goal of choosing a venire that would be made up of people who 
were not outwardly biased about the case already.253 The questionnaire asked about whether 
citizens had seen the body camera video that was released and their opinions on the Black Lives 
Matter movement.254 The twelve-person jury was made up of ten white people and two black 
people.255 During the trial, the prosecutor presented the evidence from the body camera Tensing 
wore, which showed that he was not dragged by the car, and the coroner’s testimony, which 
showed that DuBose was shot at a downward angle (meaning Tensing had not been dragged by 
the car and forced to shoot upwards), among other evidence.256 Tensing’s testimony was the last 
evidence presented to the jurors. Despite the prosecution’s evidence to the contrary, he stood by 
his story, saying that when he put his hand inside the car in an attempt to restrain DuBose, 
DuBose started driving and he felt that he was being dragged by the car. He said he feared for his 
 
253 Tensing’s attorney wanted the trial moved out of Hamilton County, arguing that Hamilton County citizens could 
not be objective given all the publicity and protests surrounding the shooting. 
Jacon-Duffy, Marais, “TIMELINE: Sam DuBose’s Shooting Death to Ray Tensing’s Murder Trial.” 
254 Ibid. 
255 The process to select the jurors for this case was atypical: 1000 potential jurors made up the venire, and the pool 
was narrowed to 195 citizens for the voir dire. They were brought into the courtroom in three groups and both the 
attorneys for the defense and the prosecution were able to ask them questions. 
Ibid. 
256 One shocking piece of evidence presented was that the shirt that Tensing wore under his uniform that day 
pictured a Confederate flag.  
Ibid. 
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life. Tensing got emotional during his testimony, and explicitly stated that from his “perception,” 
his life was in danger.257 The jury deliberated for four days but could not reach a verdict. Four 
jurors believed Tensing guilty of murder, four jurors only believed him guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter, and four believed he was not guilty. The judge was forced to declare a mistrial.258 
The state decided to try Tensing a second time.259 The jury for the second trial was slightly more 
diverse than at the first trial: three of the jurors were black and the other nine were white.260 The 
same evidence was presented, and again, the jury was unable to reach a verdict, even after five 
days of deliberation. Once again, the judge declared a mistrial.261 The prosecutor’s office decided 
not to try the case a third time after coming to the conclusion that the case could not be won.262 
An independent investigation on the incident told a different story: it concluded in no 
uncertain terms that Officer Tensing’s actions were not justifiable. The report found that 
Tensing’s traffic stop of DuBose was lawful and justified, and his initial approach was conducted 
appropriately and safely. However, after DuBose admitted he did not have his license with him, 
Tensing’s conduct changed. The report stated, “Officer Tensing thereafter made critical errors in 
judgement and exercised poor police tactics that created a hazard of serious bodily injury or 
death.”263 Tensing drew his weapon unnecessarily, as DuBose’s hands were visible and he had 
not displayed any aggression. Tensing testified that his arm was caught in the steering wheel 
when DuBose started to drive, and that he was “holding on for dear life” to avoid getting dragged 
 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
259 There were several changes between the first and second trials: the judge from the first trial recused herself and a 
new prosecutor took over the case. 
Ibid. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid. 
263 “Review and Investigation of Officer Raymond M. Tensing’s Use of Deadly Force on July 19, 2015: University 
of Cincinnati Police Department,” 5. 
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under the car. He believed his life was in danger, and that if he had not fired his weapon, he 
would have been killed or seriously injured.264 The report found that the body camera footage did 
not support Tensing’s story. At no point did the footage show Tensing’s arm caught in the car, 
and Tensing was in complete control of his arm before he fired his weapon. In fact, his left arm 
was mostly, if not entirely, out of the car when he used his right arm to aim at DuBose’s head.265 
The report concluded that the entire situation was preventable, Tensing lied in his testimony, and 
the shooting that killed Samuel DuBose was not justified.266 
It is impossible to know exactly what biases, implicit or otherwise, these twenty-four 
jurors brought with them into the trials of Ray Tensing. Additionally, the information about how 
accurately the venire represented the larger community and which potential jurors were struck 
for what reasons were not released to the public. But there are important conclusions that can be 
drawn from this case about the inability for juries to fairly judge cases in which white police 
officers shoot and kill unarmed African American men. Rarely are there instances in which the 
verdicts of two separate jury trials on the same case can be compared to an independent report to 
examine how accurate the jury was in deciding guilt based on the facts, but Tensing’s trials 
provide a unique opportunity to do just that. The results do not fare well for jury trials, the 
supposedly democratic institution that is tasked with delivering justice. While an independent 
investigation unquestionably concluded that Officer Tensing unjustifiably killed Samuel 
DuBose, two different jury trials were unable to come to the same verdict. The jurors believed 
Tensing’s account that DuBose, a black man, acted aggressively, and that Tensing would have 
died had he not shot into the car that day. Experts who testified to the contrary and the literal 
 
264 Ibid., 5-6. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ibid.  
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footage of the incident were not enough to unanimously persuade twelve ordinary American 
citizens that Tensing’s testimony was false; in believing that Tensing was in danger, they 
concluded that the shooting was justified. Officer Ray Tensing, like so many other police 
officers, was able to shoot an unarmed African American man and walk away without criminal 
consequences because the legal system is designed in a way that favors police officers, even in 
the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion  
 On November 22, 2014, a twelve-year-old African American boy named Tamir Rice was 
shot and killed by Timothy Loehmann, an officer of the Cleveland Division of Police. The events 
of the day were caught on several cameras; there was no question about the circumstances that 
brought about the young boy’s death. Tamir Rice’s death and the lack of consequences for his 
killer epitomize the institutional protection afforded to police officers by the legal system. All of 
the elements described in the previous chapters culminate in the story of what happened to Tamir 
Rice. The prosecutor’s office applied Supreme Court case law, evaluated the threat that Tamir 
Rice posed to Loehmann, and presented it to a grand jury without recommending that charges be 
filed against the officer. Unsurprisingly, the Loehmann was not charged: he was shielded from 
consequences by a system that was shaped to protect him. The prosecutor in charge of the case 
called the incident “a perfect storm of human error, mistake and communications by all involved 
that day…”267 No one faced any punishment for the death of the twelve-year old boy. The legal 
system found that the police officer who shot and killed Tamir acted reasonably. This begs the 
question: if this is a “just” result, then is the legal system a system of justice at all?  
 The day of Tamir’s death began like any other day. He, his sister, and some friends went 
to the Cudell Recreation Center in Cleveland. Tamir had his friend’s airsoft pistol that looked 
like a real firearm: there used to be an orange tip on the end to signify that it was not a real gun, 
but it had fallen off. Tamir was playing with the gun, pointing it at people and objects, and a 
bystander who was waiting for the bus nearby saw him. The bystander called the police to alert 
them about Tamir’s behavior. The bystander reported, “I’m sitting here in the park by West 
Boulevard by the West Boulevard Rapid Transit Station. There’s a guy with a pistol. It’s 
 
267 Ashley Fantz, Steve Almasy, and Catherine E. Shoichet. “Tamir Rice Shooting: No Charges for Officers.” CNN, 
December 28, 2015. https://www.cnn.com/2015/12/28/us/tamir-rice-shooting/index.html. 
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probably fake, but he’s like pointing it at everybody… Guy keeps pulling it in and out of his 
pants. It’s probably fake, but you know what? It’s scaring the shit out of me.”268 Notably, the 
bystander says both that Tamir looks young and that the gun is probably not real.269 However, 
when the call taker relayed the information to the dispatcher, she did not include those details. 
The dispatcher then notified the police that this was a Code-1, which was the highest priority, 
and Officers Garmback and Loehhmann agreed to respond.270 Garmback drove the police car to 
the Recreation Center via a dead-end street and drove over the curb onto the grass of the park. It 
had snowed recently, so the car skidded forward 40 feet and stopped right in front of the gazebo, 
under which Tamir was sitting. As the car was sliding, Tamir walked a few steps towards the 
field and then towards the police car. Loehmann got out of the car as soon as it stopped moving, 
and Tamir reached into his waistband. Two seconds after exiting the car, Loehmann fired two 
shots, and one hit Tamir in the abdomen. Three minutes later, a detective and an FBI Special 
Agent who were investigating a nearby bank robbery arrived at the scene after hearing the shots 
fired report. The Special Agent immediately began to administer first aid to Tamir and told 
Garmback to help. No one had attempted to help Tamir in the interim time before the Special 
Agent arrived; Loehmann was nursing his ankle in the car, which he had twisted after firing his 
weapon. An ambulance arrived about ten minutes later and Tamir was rushed to the nearest 
hospital, but his injuries were too severe, and he died later that day.271 
 
268 Timothy J. McGinty. “Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Report on the November 22, 2014 Shooting Death of 
Tamir Rice.” Cuyahoga County, n.d. http://prosecutor.cuyahogacounty.us/pdf_prosecutor/en-
US/Rice%20Case%20Report%20FINAL%20FINAL%2012-28a.pdf. 2-3.  
269 “He’s sitting on a swing right now, but he keeps pulling it in and out of his pants, and pointing it at people. He’s 
probably a juvenile; you know?” 
Ibid., 3. 
270 Officer Loehmann was a trainee at the time, under the supervision of Officer Garmback. 
Ibid., 2-4. 
271 Ibid., 2-5. 
 85 
 In an unsurprising decision given their position and power within the legal system, when 
the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office did a full investigation of Tamir Rice’s case, they 
found Officer Loehmann’s actions justified. They applied the relevant case law to the facts of the 
case and concluded that Loehmann acted reasonably in his use of force against Tamir Rice. They 
used the objective reasonableness test from Graham v. Connor: from Officer Loehmann’s 
perspective, at the time of the shooting, without the benefit of hindsight, the prosecutors 
concluded that Tamir reasonably posed a threat to Loehmann, Garmback, and anyone nearby at 
the Recreation Center. Officer Loehmann knew that there was a black person with a gun at the 
Recreation Center. He did not have the relevant information or the benefit of hindsight to know 
that the gun was not real. The prosecutors’ report wrote, “Within the Cleveland Police dispatch 
system, a Code-1 was the highest priority call and designated the incident as a significant public 
risk… Because the 911 call-taker had not transmitted any information to the Dispatcher about the 
suspect possibly being a juvenile, or the gun possibly being fake, Officers Loehmann and 
Garmback only knew that a man in a camouflage hat and a gray jacket with black sleeves was 
sitting at the Cudell swings pulling a gun out of his pants and pointing it [at] people.”272 The 
prosecutors used forensic video analysis to corroborate the evidence from the officers’ 
statements that they saw Tamir with a gun and that they gun he was holding “was functionally 
identical to a real firearm.”273 Tennessee v. Garner allows police officers to use deadly force if a 
suspect poses a threat to them or to others. The prosecutors referenced Supreme Court and Sixth 
Circuit case law to argue that Loehmann’s mistaken belief in a threat was still sufficient to fulfill 
the Garner requirement for deadly force. The prosecutors explained, “What is a ‘reasonable’ 
belief in light of the officer’s perceptions could also be a mistaken belief, and the fact that it 
 
272 Ibid., 41. 
273 Ibid., 50-55, 66-69. 
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turned out to be mistaken does not detract from its reasonableness when considered within the 
factual context and compressed time-frame of his decision to act.”274 The legal precedent, as 
applied to this case, supports the idea that Officer Loehmann acted reasonably and justifiably 
used force, therefore securing him the advantages of qualified immunity.  
Implicit bias no doubt played a role in the prosecutors’ belief that Tamir Rice was a real 
threat to the officers. Tamir was tall and large for his age: the autopsy report indicated that he 
was 5 feet 7 inches tall and weighed 195 pounds, and when one of the officers reported shots 
fired on the radio, he estimated Tamir to be around 20 years old.275 At a glance, Tamir probably 
looked more like an adult than a twelve-year old boy, and this likely influenced the prosecutors’ 
assessment that Tamir was a real threat to the officers instead of just a child playing at the local 
Recreation Center. The prosecutors took the perspective of Officer Loehmann—the man against 
whom they were supposedly building a case—and saw that from his point of view at the time of 
the shooting, it seemed that a large black male with a gun that he was using to threaten people 
was reaching into his waistband to use it against the officers. While all the evidence suggests that 
Tamir was pulling out the gun either to show that it was fake or give it to the officers, Officer 
Loehmann could only act within the information that he knew.276 The prosecutors then presented 
a preponderance of evidence to a grand jury. They made an argument as if they were acting as 
Officer Loehmann’s defense attorney and did not recommend any charges against the officer. 
The grand jury was then left to make a decision, and with the legal advice of the prosecutors 
 
274 Ibid. 36. (Internal citations omitted.) 
275 Ralph Ellis, and Melissa Gray. “Tamir Rice Report: No Proof Police Officer Shouted Warning before Shooting.” 
CNN, June 15, 2015. https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/13/us/tamir-rice-report/index.html. 
Timothy J. McGinty. “Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Report on the November 22, 2014 Shooting Death of Tamir 
Rice.” 4. 
276 Ashley Fantz, Steve Almasy, and Catherine E. Shoichet. “Tamir Rice Shooting: No Charges for Officers.”  
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supporting Officer Loehmann and the grand jury’s own implicit biases, it is unsurprising that the 
grand jury acted as a rubber stamp for the prosecutors’ office and voted against criminal charges.  
The Tamir Rice case rocked America to its core, both when the shooting occurred and 
when the prosecutors’ office announced that Tamir’s killer would not even be charged with a 
crime. There were protests in Cleveland and all over the country, and Tamir Rice’s name and 
story became a rallying cry for the Black Lives Matter movement. Tamir Rice’s death rightfully 
enraged people, especially at a time when cases of police officers killing unarmed black men 
were widely publicized. Many people viewed this case within the context of the Cleveland 
Division of Police, which displayed a pattern of Fourth Amendment violations against the 
citizens of Cleveland, including unnecessarily and excessively using deadly force and tactics that 
endanger citizens and make the use of force inevitable.277 President Obama contextualized the 
shooting within the larger criminal justice system. He said, “These fatal shootings are not 
isolated incidents… They are symptomatic of the broader challenges within our criminal-justice 
system, the racial disparities that appear across the system year after year, and the resulting lack 
of trust that exists between law enforcement and too many of the communities they serve.”278  
Those who saw Tamir Rice’s death and his killer’s lack of punishment as part of a larger 
problem in America still failed to grasp the gravity of what Tamir Rice’s case exposes: the 
criminal justice system is purposefully made to have these results. Prosecutors are powerful 
enough to keep police officers from facing any punishment and are themselves unaccountable to 
the public when they make decisions based on career incentives. The Supreme Court has 
 
277 Vanita Gupta, and Steven M. Dettelbach. “Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police.” United States 
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, December 4, 2014. 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1375050/doc.pdf. 
278 Nora Kelly Lee. “President Obama: ‘This Is an American Issue That We Should All Care About.’” The Atlantic, 
July 7, 2016, sec. Politics. https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/obama-shootings-minnesota-
louisiana/490403/. 
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structured legal immunities for police officers to encompass unethical, violent behavior and 
effectively prioritized officers’ power over individuals’ freedom and safety. The de facto 
discrimination of the jury selection process continues a historical tradition of unfair 
jurisprudence that allows implicit biases to impede fair verdicts. These parts of the greater 
system all work in tandem to protect police officers and excuse on-duty shootings of unarmed 
African Americans.  
Nearly everyone would benefit from the legal system being structured differently as to 
not allow for these regular miscarriages of justice. Although the repercussions of this structure 
are most easily observed in urban, black populations, the same laws and structures that protect 
police officers from liability when they use excessive force against African Americans still apply 
when excessive force is used against people of any other race. The people who benefit from the 
current system are those who take advantage of it to further their own career ambitions, such as 
prosecutor politicians that have been able to use the system to gain power.279 Bad police officers 
also use the system to excuse their bad behavior and avoid punishment for their actions. 
Paradoxically, good police officers are hurt by the favorability that the criminal justice system 
affords them. Good police officers—those without malicious intentions, with no desire to 
unjustifiably kill citizens—have exceedingly difficult and dangerous jobs because of the lack of 
 
279 One of the more recent and public examples of this can be found in Kamala Harris, who formerly served as the 
District Attorney of San Francisco and then the Attorney General of California. As an African American woman, 
Harris might seem an unlikely person to benefit from a system that justifies abuses against African Americans. 
However, she recognized how to gain power within the system and used it to her advantage, playing into the pattern 
of prosecutorial practices that had been established previously by racist white prosecutors. In her role as the lead 
prosecutor, Harris built a reputation for excusing misconduct and continuing to fight cases of wrongful conviction 
by exploiting legal technicalities to ensure that sentences were not overturned. In 2015, she opposed legislation that 
would have required her office to investigate police officers after shootings. After serving as the Attorney General of 
California, Kamala Harris was elected to the United States Senate, and later ran an unsuccessful campaign for 
President of the United States. She is but one example of prosecutors who use the system to advance their careers, at 
the expense of the most vulnerable populations in their jurisdictions.  
Bazelon, Lara. “Kamala Harris Was Not a ‘Progressive Prosecutor.’” The New York Times. January 17, 2019, sec. 
Opinion. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/opinion/kamala-harris-criminal-justice.html. 
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trust citizens have in them. When the justice system fails to hold police officers accountable, the 
community becomes even less trusting of the legal system and its agents. This makes it harder 
for police officers to keep those communities safe; it is a cycle of unaccountability and 
unnecessary danger. 
America’s legal system allows for, excuses, and accepts the kind of state-sponsored 
violence against African Americans that most people believe ended during the Civil Rights 
Movement. In light of this, Tamir Rice’s death is not an anomaly, but a tragic example of the 
perpetuation of racial violence by the American legal system itself, and his killer’s escape from 
punishment is a foregone conclusion. Tamir Rice and so many others have paid the price for the 
way the criminal justice system is structured. The American legal system, just like the country 
itself, was founded with roots in inequality, but with idealistic beliefs in its possibilities. It was 
structured with the ability to change with time and new understandings of morality. Because of 
this, the legal system can become a body that no longer excuses the current violence against 
African Americans, and in fact can be a part of dismantling the institutional forces that allow for 
its perpetuation. Prosecutorial reform could be accomplished by strengthening ethical rules and a 
having a functional disciplinary system for prosecutorial misconduct, as well as improved 
electoral processes through public information campaigns, prosecution review boards, and 
studies on the racial disparities of prosecutorial decisions.280 The Supreme Court could retreat 
from their previous decisions concerning the doctrines of qualified immunity and excessive 
force, restoring qualified immunity to balance the two evils it was originally intended to check 
and allowing for Fourteenth Amendment claims in excessive force cases.281 This could be 
 
280 Davis, Angela J. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor. 179-195.  
281 One leading legal scholar on the subject has argued that the complete abolishment of qualified immunity would 
be beneficial to the entire legal system. She wrote, “…abolishing qualified immunity would clarify the law, reduce 
the costs of litigation, and shift the focus of Section 1983 litigation to what should be the critical issue in these 
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fostered through an unlikely partnership between Justices Sotomayor and Thomas, the latter of 
whom wrote a concurrence in a recent qualified immunity case arguing that qualified immunity 
should only protect conduct that would be protected by historical common law notions of 
qualified immunity.282 Juries could be formed using more inclusive methods of constructing 
venires that do not disproportionately exclude African Americans, Batson standards could be 
more rigorously applied by trial judges and scrutinized by Appeals Courts, and more education 
on the practice of jury nullification could inspire jurors to make decisions based not just on the 
letter of the law but on the principles of justice.283 The criminal justice system is working the 
way it has been designed to work, which is to say, excusing and allowing state-sponsored 
violence against African Americans through the justification of inherently unjust police 
shootings. But it does not need to work this way. Just as the Supreme Court incrementally 
changes legal doctrines, the criminal justice system can be incrementally reformed to become the 
just legal system it ought to be.  
 
  
  
 
cases—whether government officials have exceeded their constitutional authority. But eliminating qualified 
immunity would not significantly alter the scope of constitutional protections, dramatically increase plaintiffs’ 
success rates, or transform government practices that currently dampen the effects of lawsuits on officers’ and 
officials’ decisionmaking.”   
Joanna C. Schwartz. “After Qualified Immunity.” Columbia Law Review 120, no. 309 (2020). 
282 Ziglar v. Abbasi, (2017) 582 US __. 
283 Jury nullification is mostly used to acquit defendants for whom a strict interpretation of the law would result in 
their conviction. However, the purpose of jury nullification is for individual jurors to look past the letter of the law 
and vote in a way that they believe produces a just result. One scholar wrote on the benefits of jury nullification, 
“The jury listens to the evidence presented in the case and decides who is telling the truth. ‘In a sense, the jury 
serves as the conscience of the community.’ Jurors may interpret the law in question without any repercussions. 
Ultimately, ‘jurors can do as they please, and refusing to apply a law sometimes pleases them.’”  
John Clark. “The Social Psychology of Jury Nullification.” Law & Psychology Review 24, no. 39 (2000). 53. 
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